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Economic Development and Female Labor Force
Participation in the Middle East and North Africa:
A Test of the U-Shape Hypothesis
By Kelsey Chapman
Abstract:
This paper investigates the relationship between economic development
and female labor force participation in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA). Using a panel data set of 20 countries in the region for the
period of 1990-2012, I develop an econometric model that tests the
U-shape hypothesis. This study builds upon previous literature examining
the U-shape hypothesis in time series studies for developing countries,
and cross-country studies. The results of this paper suggest that there
is a U-shaped relationship between economic growth and female labor
force participation rates. The MENA region’s low female labor force
participation rates can be explained in part by their transition towards the
bottom of the U-shaped curve.
I. Introduction
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has the lowest
female labor force participation rates in the developing world (Verme,
2014). Despite moderate economic growth, gains in female education, and
drops in fertility rates, female labor force participation rates have stayed
incredibly low in the region. In some cases, the participation rates have
even fallen over the past few decades, as is the case in Morocco. Are
countries in the MENA region just at the turning point of the U curve, or
are there other unknown factors at play?
Understanding the relationship between economic development
and female labor force participation is important for a variety of reasons.
The U-shape hypothesis suggests that there is a sort of tradeoff between
5

gender equality and economic growth during a country’s development.
Studying this relationship is important for academics and policy makers
alike to identify trends in labor force participation and to design and
implement policy to that end.
Prior research has established a U-shaped relationship between
female labor force participation and economic development. There is a
considerable amount of literature that has provided cross-country evidence
for the hypothesis (Boserup, 1970; Durand, 1975; Psacharopoulos, 1989;
Kottis, 1990; Goldin, 1995; Tam, 2011), as well as time series studies for
developed countries such as the United States (Goldin, 1995). Few papers
have tested the U-shape hypothesis within the context of developing
regions and countries, however (Tansel, 2001). Even fewer have done
econometric research focused specifically on the MENA region (Verme,
2014; Tsani, 2012). Recent papers studying the U-shape hypothesis have
utilized more sophisticated econometric methods and have found less
robust evidence for the hypothesis (Gaddis, 2013; Verme 2014).
In the next section of this paper I will discuss the theory and
evidence behind the U-shape hypothesis. After that I will describe the
model used, derived from previous literature (Gaddis, 2013; Verme,
2014). In the following section I will describe the data collected to test
the U-shape hypothesis. In the final sections I will present my results,
limitations and conclusions.
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II. Literature Review
The U-shaped hypothesis states that at the beginning of economic
development, when agriculture dominates the economy, more women
participate in the labor force. Typically fertility rates are still high, but most
women have the ability to work and raise children by working on their
family farms or by creating household businesses. As a country’s economy
undergoes structural changes and transitions from agriculture to industry
though, women’s labor force participation rates tend to fall. Women are
unable to take advantage of work opportunities in formal and industrial
sectors during the early stages of economic development. Fertility rates
are still high, but the move from agriculture to industry limits their ability
to work and raise children, lowering labor force participation. Women are
also restricted from entering the labor force because of lower levels of
female education. In fields that require heavy manual labor, social stigma
against female workers lowers the labor force participation rate as well.
Consistent with basic labor economic theory, as there is an overall increase
in productivity and family earnings, there is a negative income effect on
female labor supply (Gaddis, 2013).
In later stages of economic development, as female education
increases, fertility rates decline, and socio-cultural attitudes evolve, the
participation rate increases (Goldin, 1995). The emergence of white-collar
sectors provide new employment opportunities for women that are not
subject to the same social stigmas. Moreover, increasing access to childcare
facilities and the availability of part-time jobs allow women to work
7

outside the home while raising children. By this point, the substitution
effect leads to higher potential female wages which overcomes the income
effect, raising female labor force participation as income per capita rises
(Gaddis, 2013).
Cross-country studies have found consistent evidence for the
U-shape hypothesis. Goldin (1995) found that the relationship held for a
group of about 100 countries in both 1980 and 1985. Mammon and Paxson
(2011), using data from 90 countries from the 1970s to the 1980s, also
found similar evidence. Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1989) looked at
a set of 136 countries between 1960 and 1980 and also found a U-shaped
relationship. They argue that high and low income countries have the
highest female labor force participation rates. Tam (2011), found similar
results using panel data for a set of 134 countries from 1950-1980.
Goldin (1995) also examined time-series data for a study on the
United States and found evidence for the U-shape hypothesis. Female
labor force participation fell during the early stages of economic growth
and rose later as development continued. Similar results were found by
a study done by Tilly and Scott (1987) for England and France, other
developed nations. There are fewer studies on developing countries due to
a lack of data. Tansel (2001), examined time series evidence on provinces
in Turkey and found evidence for the U-shaped hypothesis.
Gaddis (2013) found less robust evidence for the U-shape
hypothesis testing both a static (OLS and fixed effects) model and a
8

dynamic (autoregressive) model. This paper used cross-country data from
1980-2005 and found that the results for the U-shape hypothesis were
very sensitive to the data source used. The study also found little support
for the structural change hypothesis from agriculture to industry as an
explanation for low female labor force participation on the declining side
of the U curve. The paper did find that fertility and education had a role
in explaining the rising side of the U curve. Gaddis (2013) also estimated
separate regressions for OECD and non-OECD countries and found no
evidence for the U-shaped relationship among non-OECD countries. They
concluded that, “while it remains possible that todays advanced economies
transitioned through the U over the course of their economic development,
the U-shape seems to have little relevance for most developing countries
today” (Gaddis, 2013 pp. 26).
To the best of my knowledge, only two papers have examined
the U-shape hypothesis in the MENA region, Tsani (2013) and Verme
(2014). Tsani (2013) tested the U-shape hypothesis and region-specific
effects for the MENA and used the resulting coefficients to compute a
general equilibrium model. The paper used data from the International
Labour Organization and the World Bank. The model employed used
control variables for education, fertility, urbanization, religious norms, and
unemployment rates. The estimation results were robust with the control
variables, and found evidence for the determinants of female labor force
participation rates as well as the U-shape hypothesis.
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Verme (2014) divided analysis between parametric and
nonparametric evidence using data collected from the International
Labor Organization and the World Bank. The researcher’s nonparametric
evidence showed that the U-shape hypothesis held both worldwide
and within the MENA region itself. The paper suggested that MENA
countries are at the turning point of the U-shaped curve, explaining their
low female labor force participation rates. The parametric evidence did
not hold as strongly though, with some countries in the region showing
non-significance or even an inverted U-shape. The paper used a model
similar to Gaddis (2013) and also suggested that the U-relationship had
little relevance for developing countries.
The literature also provides a full discussion of the determinants of
labor force participation, the pillars of the U-shape hypothesis. Labor force
participation decisions seem to be jointly determined by the individual
women and their households as well as by overall market conditions.
Education has a positive effect on female labor force participation, by
increasing the potential earnings made by the women as well as increasing
the opportunity cost of not working (Tsani, 2013; Tansel, 2001). Also, higher
education rates are usually accompanied by lower fertility rates which
can increase female labor force participation. Fertility itself is expected
to have a negative correlation with female labor force participation (Lin,
2011). As socio-cultural attitudes change and women’s productive versus
reproductive roles are valued, more and more women enter the labor force.
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The literature suggests that female labor force participation is
affected by economic growth, unemployment and urbanization. The
effects of unemployment can sometimes be ambiguous. The higher the
unemployment rate, the less likely a women will be able to find a job
(even as opposed to a man in the MENA). The “discouraged worker”
hypothesis implies that unemployment has a negative effect on labor
force participation (Tsani, 2013). The degree of urbanization may affect
the number of jobs available to women. Urban areas tend to have more
employment opportunities, and can sometimes be more liberal in terms
of socio-cultural attitudes. Thus, the greater number of urban areas in a
country, the higher female labor force participation will be (Tsani, 2013).
III. Model
As discussed in the previous section, there is a considerable
amount of evidence to suggest the U-shaped relationship between
economic development and female labor force participation rates using
cross-sectional methods. Typically GDP per capita is used as a proxy
for economic development. The model used in the literature to test the
hypothesis has been:
FLFPRi=α+β1lnyi+β2(lnyi)2+ui
Yi is GDP per capita, with i acting as a subscript for countries. The U-shape
hypothesis holds if the estimated coefficients are as follows: β1<0 and
β2>0. This is a simple cross-country equation and is applied to one point
in time in the literature.
11

With more data, allowing for panels to be created, the model has
also been transformed to:
FLFPRit=α+β1lnyit+β2(lnyit)2+uit
This is still a cross sectional model, because the coefficients only measure
the average change in female labor force participation rates as GDP
changes. This model ignores time and country specific effects, but has
been used in the literature to find evidence for the U-shape hypothesis. The
OLS estimator is incredibly biased without correcting for time-invariant
heterogeneity.
A more appropriate model uses a fixed effects estimator, which
controls for country specific effects (Gaddis, 2013; Verme, 2014).
FLFPRit=αi+β1lnyit+β2(lnyit)2+δt+uit
This controls for time-invariant, country factors effecting female labor
force participation. δt is the fixed effects. This model is still not optimal,
because if female labor force participation does not vary much over time,
lagged female labor force participation is correlated with the error term.
The regressors are most likely endogenous as well, introducing further
issues. A linear dynamic panel data model could correct for these issues
but such methods are beyond the scope of this paper. Estimation using
instrumental variables and Two Stage Least Squares could also be used.
but proper instrumental variables were not found.
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This paper’s model will be similar to the ones used by Gaddis
(2013), and Verme (2014), but will use the control variables provided by
the model employed by Tsani (2013).
FLFPRit=αi+β1lnyit+β2(lnyit)2+ β3educit+ β4fertit+ β5unemit+
β5urbanit+t+δt+uit
The added variables include controls for education, fertility, unemployment,
and urbanization. A time trend is also included. For the U-shape hypothesis
to hold, I would expect β1<0 and β2>0. For the control variables, I would
expect the coefficients on education and urbanization to be positive, and
the coefficients on unemployment and fertility to be negative. These results
would be consistent with the arguments made in the literature which were
discussed in the previous section.
IV. Data
Data for all of the variables was collected from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators database. Female labor force participation
is defined as the number of females aged 15 and up who are in the
labor force divided by the total female population. Economic growth is
controlled for using GDP/capita in current U.S. dollars. GDP per capita
is the gross domestic product divided by the midyear population of the
country. The control variable for education used was the percentage of
female students in secondary education. This is defined as the total number
of females in secondary school over the total number of students enrolled
in secondary education. Fertility was controlled for using the fertility rate
13

in each country. The total fertility rate is the number of children that would
be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years
and bear children during that time. Unemployment rates are defined by the
share of the labor force that is without work and is available and seeking
employment. Urbanization is controlled for with the urban population
percentage, or the total number of people living in urban areas over the
total population of each country (World Bank).
The econometric approach used pooled panel data for a set of 20
countries for the period of 1990-2012. This is the same data used by many
of the cross-country studies reviewed in the previous section. The data set
is an unbalanced panel, with several observations missing over different
variables, countries, and years. The reasons for some of the missing
observations might be correlated with the idiosyncratic errors, which could
lead to biased and inconsistent estimators. Collecting data in the MENA
region has always been fraught with difficulties though, and there is no
available data set or method to account for these missing observations.
Table 1 – Summary statistics
Variable

Observations Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

FLFP

460

24.64

11.23

9.20

58.10

GDP per capita

432

10,323.71 13,946.88

283.58

92632.68

% females secondary
education

352

47.32

4.10

26.04

53.26

Fertility rate

460

3.45

1.30

1.50

8.67

% urban population 460

70.98

17.83

20.93

98.95

440

10.39

6.23

0.30

30.7

% unemployment
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There is wide heterogeneity across MENA countries in terms of
GDP per capita and urbanization rates. There is quite a difference between
the Gulf region (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab
Emirates), and the rest of the MENA. This could complicate estimation
of the regression model, with the outliers biasing the coefficient estimates,
but with such a small sample of countries over time, observations should
not be dropped.
V. Empirical Results
Results for the regression estimated by OLS are shown in Table
2. The regression output confirms the U-shape hypothesis, with similar
results to those found in the literature. The GDP per capita variables
are both statistically significant, with β1<0 and β2>0. In the past, results
from this type of estimation have been used as evidence for the U-shape
hypothesis, but as stated previously, pooled OLS estimation is biased in
the presence of unobserved, time-invariant effects.

Table 2 – OLS Regression
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

GDP/capita

-22.76***

4.80

GDP/capita2

1.58***

0.27

Education

-0.84***

0.13

Fertility

-2.02***

0.43

Urbanization

0.14***

0.05

Unemployment

-0.29***

0.08

Time trend

-0.18***

0.07

Significance level: ***=.01; **=.05; *=.1
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The results for the fixed effects estimation of the model are
shown in Table 3. The econometric estimation also confirms the U-shap
hypothesis on the relationship between economic growth and female
labor force participation with β1<0 and β2>0. The coefficient estimates are
statistically significant for both GDP per capita variables. A period of 22
years may be too short to observe a full U-shape but the results suggest
that there is one. The within R2 of the model was 56%. This is the amount
of time variation in yit that can be explained by the time variation in the
explanatory variables.
Table 3 – Fixed Effects Regression
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

GDP/capita

-10.96***

2.51

GDP/capita

0.55***

0.13

2

Education

-0.63***

0.11

Fertility

-2.34***

0.34

Urbanization

0.05

0.10

Unemployment

-0.10*

0.05

Time trend

0.25***

0.05

Significance level: ***=.01; **=.05; *=.1

The coefficient on fertility rates was found to have a statistically
significant, negative effect on female labor force participation, in line with
theory from the literature. Unemployment rates also had a statistically
significant negative effect, although the magnitude of the coefficient was
quite small. The coefficient on urbanization was not statistically significant
and had a small positive effect on female labor force participation.
The coefficient estimate on education is the most puzzling,
having a negative sign and implying that increased education leads to
16

lower female labor force participation rates. This may be explained by the
fact that although secondary education rates have increased dramatically
over the past 30 years, this has not translated into increased labor force
participation. Female labor force participation rates have remained
stagnant despite gains in secondary and tertiary education for women in
the MENA region (Verme, 2014).
The most important assumption for using fixed effects is the strict
exogeneity assumption. This holds if the idiosyncratic error in each year is
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in all time periods. Using fixed
effects, we allow some variables to be correlated with unobserved effects
that are constant over time. It is probably not reasonable to assume that the
dependent variables are uncorrelated with the errors. Strict exogeneity can
be overcome if enough time-varying factors have been controlled for, but
clearly there are more variables effecting female labor force participation
that are not included in the regression model. These include variables to
control for gender and social norms, which have been shown in qualitative
research to have an important impact on female labor force participation.
The other assumptions needed to estimate using fixed effects are
that the errors in the regression are homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated.
Testing for serial correlation there is strong evidence of serial correlation
in the errors (p-value=0.00). This means that the test statistics for the
estimated regression are invalid. It is difficult to test for serial correlation
after fixed effects estimation, but the time-demeaned errors can be used for
all of the usual tests.
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Testing for hetroskedasticity, there is also strong evidence that it
exists (p-value=0.00). With the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation, I applied fixed effects to a cluster sample. Each country, or
cross-sectional unit is treated as a cluster of observations over time. Serial
correlation, and changing variances are allowed for in each cluster. Using
this approach, the standard errors are raised across all of the explanatory
variables, as seen in the regression output in Table 4.
Table 4 – Fixed Effects Regression with robust errors
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

GDP/capita

-10.96**

5.16

GDP/capita

0.55*

0.27

Education

-0.63**

0.23

Fertility

-2.34***

0.66

Urbanization

0.05

0.22

Unemployment

-0.10

0.08

Time trend

0.25*

0.14

2

Significance level: ***=.01; **=.05; *=.1

The GDP per capita coefficients were still statistically significant,
as well as the coefficients for the time trend, education and fertility
variables. The coefficients for urbanization and unemployment were not
statistically significant after using robust standard errors.
This method still does not properly account for the fact that lagged
female labor force participation is correlated with the error term. GDP per
capita is an endogenous variable, and there is a feedback loop between
female labor force participation rates and GDP per capita which biases
the coefficient estimates. A linear dynamic panel model using Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) with instrumental variables can accommodate
18

for endogeneity and autocorrelation. Past papers have used this method,
but it is beyond the scope of this paper. Two Stage Least Squares could
also be used to account for the endogeneity of GDP per capita, but a proper
instrumental variable could not be found.
VI. Conclusions
This paper looked at the relationship between female labor force
participation and economic growth in the MENA region. It has done so by
using a fixed effects model with control variables for education, fertility,
unemployment, urbanization and a time trend. The econometric results
provided evidence for the U-shape hypothesis in the MENA region. There
is wide heterogeneity across MENA countries, but it was still possible
to establish a relationship between female labor force participation and
economic growth over the time period analyzed.
The MENA region has made significant strides in reducing
gender gaps in human development over the past few decades. This has
not translated into improvements in female labor force participation,
however (Verme, 2014). This suggests that there might be other factors
discouraging women from participating in the labor force. Understanding
the relationship between economic development and female labor force
participation will help isolate in which areas the MENA region lags behind
the rest of the developing world in terms of getting more women into
the work force. This paper’s results suggest that part of the region’s low
female labor force participation rates can be explained by its transition
towards the bottom of the U-shaped curve.
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There were three problems with the estimated model, however.
One, it only examined a short period of time. Data on most explanatory
variables is only available starting in 1990 and this may be too short of a
time period to observe a U-shaped transition. Until longer time series are
made available for the region, this is not an issue that can be solved. The
second problem with the model employed in this paper is that it did not
control for another main pillar of the U-shape hypothesis, social and cultural
norms relating to gender. These are important factors, but at the moment
there is a lack of data relating to cultural factors to explain female labor
force participation. Historically determined, initial factors may be more
important in determining labor force participation rates as well. Without
having the proper control variables in place for things like culture and
gender norms, it may not be possible to properly estimate the relationship
between economic development and female labor force participation
rates. The final problem with the model employed is that it didn’t fully
correct for endogeneity, serial correlation, and heteroskedasticity. Without
controlling for these issues, the results are less than trust worthy.
Finally, finding a statistically significant U-shaped relationship
in cross-sectional analysis across countries does not mean that the
relationship holds across individual countries (Gaddis, 2013). A limitation
of past research, and of my research, is that cross-sectional models have
been used on panel data. As Gaddis (2013) points out, “Data on female
labor force participation from countries at different income levels are used
to infer the relationship within a single country over time” (pp.12). The
20

U-shape hypothesis is about changes over time in an individual country,
and cross-sectional results shouldn’t be an adequate test of the hypothesis.
Until longer time series become available for countries in the MENA
region, the U-shape hypothesis cannot be properly tested.
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Effects of Husband’s Education on Wife’s Earnings:
The Recent Evidence
By Humenghe Zhao
Abstract
This paper aims to examine the relationship between husband’s
education and his wife’s earnings. The study builds upon previous literature
revolving around the relationship between a woman’s human capital and
her husband’s earnings. Using pooled cross-sectional data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS), I adjust the OLS wage model to estimate whether
a man’s human capital has positive effects on his wife’s earnings. Two
major hypotheses concerning the correlation between spousal education
and earnings are cross-productivity effect between couples and assortative
mating. Using the original regression model, I also estimate a sub-sample
designed to restrict the effects of positive assortative mating. Finally,
the result suggests that there is strong evidence for the positive effect of
husband’s education on his wife’s earnings.

I.

Introduction
Human capital is the stock of an individual’s skills, knowledge,

abilities that can be used to produce economic value. It is widely recognized
that formal education is an important way to obtain human capital, and thus
labor–market productivity through providing specific skills and improving
one’s ability to acquire and process information, to understand changing
conditions, and to respond effectively (Becker 1964). Human capital is
also highly influenced by interaction with surrounding people, like family
and peers through sophisticated conversations, developing strategies and
coping mechanisms. Marriage, as one type of association, can provide
greater incentives to share acquired abilities and knowledge within the
23

household (Benham 1974). To the extent that this is true, not only an
individual’s own formal education and working experience contribute to
the individual’s effective stock of acquired abilities and productivity, but
also the spouse’s education has important impact on one’s own economic
outcomes, such as earnings. In this paper, I intend to explore the effect
of husbands’ human capital on the productivity and earnings of married
women, and the change of the effect over the past ten years.
Regarding the impact of spousal education, a large number of
studies were conducted on the effect of a woman’s human capital on her
husband’s earnings. The result of Benham’s (1974) study suggests that a
wife’s education has a positive effect on her husband’s earnings. Jepsen
(2005) also finds this effect significant from year 1960 to 2000, but with a
diminishing magnitude over time. Kenny (1983), Wong (1986), Lam and
Schoeni (1993), and Lefgren and McIntyre (1996) all reach the similar
conclusion that spousal education has a positive impact. However, despite
numerous studies of the effect of wife’s education on her husband’s
earnings, only few studies have examined the effect of a man’s human
capital on his wife’s earnings (Huang et al. 2009, Mano and Yamamura
2010). Although the husband’s human capital has been examined as one
of the significant determinants of the labor supply of married women, its
effect on human capital and earnings of wives has been largely neglected.
As the labor force participation of married women has expanded rapidly
over the last 30 years, it is of great importance to explore important factors
within the household that may give rise to this rapid growth.
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There are two major hypotheses that have been used to interpret
the positive correlation between spousal education and a person’s own
earnings. First, the cross-productivity hypothesis argues that the positive
effect is due to one’s investment in the spouse’s human capital. Second,
the assortative mating hypothesis argues that the positive effect results
from the fact that better-educated individuals marry more productive
individuals (Becker 1974). My interest of study is the cross-productivity
theory, but these two interpretations are difficult to separate. As will be
discussed in detail later, I would use a sub-sample to control for the effects
of positive assortative mating.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section II will briefly review
previous literature regarding the similar topics. Section III will introduce
the human capital theory and the specific econometric model employed to
exam the hypothesis. Section IV is devoted to the data and measurement
issues and the data set used in the research. Section V discusses the results
of OLS regression and hypothesis test and also provides some analysis on
the results. Section VI summarizes our findings and implications.

II.

Literature Review
Benham(1974) is the pioneer in studying the effect of spousal

education on one’s earnings. In his paper, he brings up that an individual’s
effective stock of acquired abilities will be a function of not only his/her
own formal education and job experience but also the spousal education.
He builds a model based on traditional human capital theories, where the
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household is viewed as a firm whose earnings are a function of the effective
stock of human capital for each marriage partner. His result suggests that
educated women improve the human capital and productivity of their
husbands within marriage.
Another early study related to this topic finds that the positive effects
of wife’s education on the labor market productivity of men are stronger
within families who are entrepreneurs in the family business (Wong 1986).
More importantly, the study considers both the effects of wife’s education
on husband’s earnings and of husband’s education on wife’s earnings
conditional on the choice of employment status. He also finds evidence that
women workers benefit form marrying more educated men.
Jepsen (2005) employs the theoretical basis proposed by Benham.
Using United States census data from 1960 to 2000, she finds that a
wife’s education is positively associated with her husband’s earnings, but
the magnitude of the effect declines over time. Jepsen adds some new
explanation to this contemporary trend by conjecturing that the rapid
increase in a wife’s labor participation reduced her time to improve
husband’s productivity. If women use their education to further their own
careers, the positive association of a wife’s education with her husband’s
earnings might not exist today; but no direct evidence was provided. She
also brings up that recent studies suggest that a person’s own education
serves a two-fold purpose – increasing human capital and signaling
productivity to potential employers.
Lam and Shoeni(1993) analyze the effects of family background
on male labor market earnings in Brazil. They try to identify the magnitude
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of the "family background bias" in conventional estimates of returns to
schooling and to identify the direct effect of family background on earnings.
Slightly different from the studies above, their research is based on a
theoretical model of assortative mating and intergenerational correlations
in income-related characteristics. Though their focus is different, they also
find a positive effect of the wife’s education on her husband’s earnings of
over 5% for Brazil and of 3-4% for the United States.
In some other studies, the husband’s human capital has been
examined as one of the significant determinants of the labor supply of
married women. Gray (1997) finds that a wife’s labor force participation
is negatively associated with her husband’s earnings, but they do not
pay direct attention to the wife’s educational level. Similarly, based on
the quantitative analysis using cross-sectional data from the CPS and the
NLSY1979, Papps (2010) suggests that men’s education has influence on
their wives’ working hours, even when holding the wages of both spouses
constant, but the impact on earnings is neglected.
The most similar studies of the kind are conducted by Huang et
al. (2009) and Mano and Ymamura (2010). Huang et al. successfully
disentangles the cross-productivity and assortative mating effects by
using Chinese twins data, and they find the importance of both effects
in explaining spousal earnings. In particular, the mating effect exists for
both husbands and wives, but the cross-productivity effect mainly runs
from Chinese husbands to wives. Mano and Yamamura investigates many
different factors that influence the labor supply and earnings among
married Japanese women between 2000 and 2002, including husband’s
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education, family structure, co-residence with parents or in-laws, and
childcare. Their finding associated with husband’s education suggests
that educated husbands reduce the labor supply of wives, but they tend to
improve productivity and earnings of the wives once they participate in
the labor market.
One key similarity among all the studies concerning the role of
spousal education in one’s own labor-market productivity is that they
all come to the conclusion that spousal education has significant and
positive impact on one’s own earnings. Benham(1974), Jepsen (2005),
Kenny (1983), Wong (1986), Lam and Schoeni (1993), and Lefgren
and McIntyre (1996) all find evidence for the positive impact of wives’
education on husband’s earnings, while Huang et al. (2009) and Mano
and Ymamura (2010) also find positive relationship between husbands’
education and wives’ labor-market productivity. The primary difference is
that previous studies employ different methods of analysis. For example,
Benham(1974), Jepsen (2005), and Mano and Ymamura (2010) use the
OLS wage model based on Mincer’s work(1974); while Wong(1986)
and Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman(1991) also use Two-Stage Least
Squares as a method to estimate a system of two equations: earnings and
education of the wife. Using Chinese twins data, Huang et al. are able to
use fixed-effects model to control for the mating effect.
Most of the previous works use data before 2000s. This paper
contributes to the literature by revisiting Benham’s OLS wage model
using Current Population Survey data from 2003, 2004, 2013 and 2014.
Moreover, this paper is the first to explore the association of the husband’s
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education with his wife’s earnings using most up-to-date data. Using
pooled cross-sections rather than simple cross-sectional data, my analysis
is also slightly different from previous literature as an interaction term
is added to the model to explore the change of the effect over the past
ten years. In later discussion, I also make a comparison of the effect of
the husband’s education on his wife’s earnings from my study to the
effect of the wife’s education on her husband’s earnings from previous
literature. The discussion of such comparison can help us facilitate a
better understanding of the contemporary role of female in the labor force
and family.

III.

Modelling
One explanation for the higher earnings of individuals married to

more educated spouses is that their spouses enable themselves to enhance
their own human capital and, therefore, their productivity and earnings.
The term “cross-productivity effect” is used to describe the contribution
of a spouse’s human capital to own productivity. As stated in the crossproductivity hypothesis, within households consisting of only married
couples, the effective stock of human capital for the wife is a positive
function of the individual stock of human capital of each spouse (Benham
1974). That is, ,, where is the effective stock of human capital for the wife
at time t and the indexes w and h represents wife and husband respectively.
The individual is viewed as a firm whose earnings at time t are a function
of the individual’s market productivity. The wife’s earnings are also a
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function of the wife’s stock of human capital. Then, in the household that
is viewed as a firm composed of husband and wife, the wife’s earnings
can be expressed as a function of both partners’ human capital stock. That
is). The first order condition is , which indicates the positive effect of the
husband’s effective human capital stock on his wife’s earnings.
The empirical model used in this paper is based on Benham’s(1974)
model, which uses a standard Mincer(1974) ordinary least squares wage
model to consider the association of the husband’s education with his
wife’s earnings. As will be discussed below, I also added other control
variables and an interaction term investigating the change of the effect.
Moreover, I used a set of dummy variables describing the wife’s education
attainment instead of using only one variable of years of schooling. I
estimate the following OLS model:
ln(earning)i=β0+β1*eduhi+β2*expi+ β3*expi2+ δ1*eduw2i+ δ2*eduw3i+ δ3*eduw4i+
δ4*eduw5i + δ5*whitei+ δ6*southi+ δ7*midwesti+ δ8*westi+ δ9*urbani
+δ10*y1314i+α1*(eduh*y1314)i +µi,

where ln(earning)=log annual earnings of wife in family with wife and
husband present,
eduh=years of schooling completed by husband,
exp=years of work experience of wife,
eudw2…eduw5=wife’s education attainment modeled as a set of
dummy variables,
white, south, midwest, west, urban and y1314 are dummy
variables indicate race, region, urban location and time,
(eduh*y1314) is the interaction term captures the change of the
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effect of husband’s education on his wife’s earnings over the ten years.
The omitted categories are as follows: wife’s education—less
than high school; race—nonwhite; location—rural, and region—East.
Benham(1974) models the natural log of the husband’s annual
earnings as a function of the years of schooling completed by the husband,
the potential work experience of the husband, and potential experience
squared. He also includes a variable for the years of schooling completed
by the wife. Built upon this model, I include other variables that may
explain the wife’s earnings, such as her race and the family’s geographic
region. By adding these variables, some of the effects of omitted variables
can be avoided. One would expect whites to earn more than non-whites
and workers in urban areas to earn more than workers in rural areas.
Workers in the East are likely to earn more than workers in the Midwest.
By modeling husband’s education as his years of schooling,
Benham gives equal weight to the difference in schooling between fifth
grade and sixth grade as to the difference between the junior and senior
years in college. Under the assumption that education increases one’s
own productivity only by increasing human capital, modeling education
as the years of schooling is appropriate. However, more recently, many
researchers suggest that “a person’s own education serves a two-fold
purpose—increasing human capital and signaling productivity to
potential employers” (Jaeger and Page 1996). That is, people who have
completed a type of degree signal their productivity and ability through
their academic credentials. Thus, a person with 16 years of education and
a bachelor’s degree may be viewed by potential employers as being a
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better prospect for employment than someone with 16 years of education
but no degree because the person with the bachelor’s degree has signaled
an ability to complete the task of earning a college degree (Hungerford
and Solon 1987). In order to allow for non-linear effects of education,
the wife’s education here is modeled as a series of dummy variables.
The categories of this classification will be described in detail in the
data section. The positive effect of the spousal education is explained
using a human capital approach (cross-productivity effect), not signaling
approach: additional years of schooling allow a husband to acquire
skills that help him assist his wife. Then, the husband’s education is still
modeled as years of schooling.
An alternative explanation for the positive association between
one’s earnings and spousal education is that individuals with higher
earnings are likely to marry partners with more desirable characteristics.
This so-called “assortative mating” hypothesis states that people have a
tendency to select marriage partners of a similar education level regardless
of cross-productivity effects. For example, if men regard education as an
asset in the marriage market, then better-educated men may attract and
marry better-educated and more productive women (Mare 1991). In
econometric language, the cross-productivity effect is the causal effect of
spousal education on earnings, but the mating effect is caused by omitted
variables. An ordinary least squares estimated of the effect of spousal
education on earnings may not show the causal effect because spousal
education is likely to pick up one’s own ability or the mating effect (Boulier
and Rosenzweg 1984). Previous studies employ several different ways to
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try to separate the two effects. For example, Benham(1974) differentiates
between the years of the wife’s education obtained before and after her
marriage in an attempt to distinguish between the two arguments. Huang
et. al. use fixed effect model with unique Chinese twins data to control
for unobserved background and ability factors. In my study, to attempt
to control for the marital-sorting effect, I consider a sub-sample using
the original regression model. In the sub-sample, only couples who are
more than 5 years apart in age are considered in an attempt to focus on
people who are less likely to have met their mate in school (Jepsen 2005).
However, these two interpretations are difficult to separate even with
longitudinal data. My approach can only bring some evidence to bear on
this issue, but may not effectively differentiate between the human capital
interpretation and the martial sorting explanation.

IV.

Data
The data are taken from the March supplements of the Current

Population Survey for year 2003, 2004, 2013 and 2014. Data sets are
pooled together; year 2003 and 2004 are treated as one time period, and
year 2013 and 2014 are treated as another time period. Households are
dropped if either spouse was a member of the armed forces or was not
aged 20-60. The earnings variable is the log of the wife’s total wage and
salary earnings, which is the dependent variable used in previous studies.
The data are restricted to wives who work full-time to avoid any earnings
effects that would be a result of part-time wok status. Dollar levels for
each year are converted into 2000-dollar level by the Consumer Price
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Index for all items. Potential work experience is estimated as age minus
schooling minus six as defined by Benham(1974). The race variables
are white and nonwhite; the location variables are urban and rural; the
categories for geographic region are East, West, Midwest and South. Five
education categories were defined for wives based on the highest grade
completed. The categories are less than a high schooling graduate, high
school graduate, some college, college graduate, and post-bachelor’s
degree work. The husband’s education is modeled as the continuous
variable of years of schooling.
Advantages of the CPS data include very large sample size and
most up-to-date data. A disadvantage is that CPS data are cross-sectional
rather than longitudinal, which makes it difficult to distinguish productivity
effects form assortative mating effects. Another drawback is that the CPS
contains no measure of individual’s ability. Though modeling the wife’s
own education as a set of dummy variables can help to pick up one’s own
ability according to the signaling theory discussed in the modeling section,
without using proxies for ability, the positive causal effect of husband’s
education is still likely to pick up wife’s own ability. However, the later
result shows that the estimated returns to husband’s education using
CPS data is similar to those obtained from other data sources in previous
literature.
The descriptive statistics of the earnings and education variables
are reported in Table1 and reveal changing demographics for married
couples over the past ten years. The average years of schooling increase
for both husbands and wives from 2003-04 period to 2013-14 period. The
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correlation coefficients that measure the degree of correlation between
the wife’s schooling and the husband’s schooling are reported at the
bottom of Table 1. The correlation are virtually unchanged from 200304 to present, which are 0.603 and 0.604 respectively. The size of the
correlation coefficients is slightly smaller than the correlations found
by Benham(0.65), Shechtman and Neuman(1991) for Israel(0.684) and
Wong for Hong Kong(0.65). The correlations provide one measure of the
propensity for positive assortative mating with respect to education. That
is, the propensity for people with similar educational attainments to marry
each other. The correlation statistics suggest that not much has changed
during the time period under study (Jepsen 2005).
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
2003-04

2013-14

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Wife
36.304

34.171

49.723

46.219

Earnings in 2000 dollars

Annual earnings(in 1000)

33.460

31.471

36.483

33.943

Years of schooling

13.880

2.72

14.229

2.729

Less than a high school degree

0.050

0.218

0.036

0.187

High school graduate

0.296

0.457

o.214

0.410

Some college

0.298

0.457

0.276

0.447

College graduate

0.235

0.423

0.285

0.451

Graduate/Professional school

0.121

0.326

0.189

0.391

14.127

2.562

14.776

2.642

Husband
Years of schooling
n

33,188
Correlation of wife/husband
schooling

22,159

0.603

0.604
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V.

Empirical Evidence

Table 2. Regression of log of wife’s annual earnings.
Independent Variables

Coefficients(robust Std. Err.)

Husband’s Education

0 .0178***
(0.0021)

Wife’s Characteristics:
High school graduate

0.360***
(0.016)

Some college

0.536***
(0.016)

College graduate

0.845***
(0.017)

Graduate/Professional school

1.084***

Experience

0.027***

(0.019)
(0.001)
Experience squared

-0.0004***
(0.00002)

White

0.032*
(0.015)

Urban location

0.202***

Midwest

-0.083***

(0.007)
(0.0086)
West

-0.056***
(0.009)

South

-0.088***
(0.0083)

Year 2013&2014

-0.012**

Husband’ s schooling* Year
2013&2014

0.004***

(0.006)

(0.001)
Adjusted R-squared

0.204
55,347

n
***Significant at the 0.01 level
**Significant at the 0.05 level
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Table 2 reports the regression results of estimating the econometric
model using the full sample. The coefficient of the key variable of interest,
the husband’s education, is reported in the first row. All of the signs of
the coefficient estimates on the variables were found to be in accord
with expectations. The coefficient of the husband’s education is positive
and significant. The simple null hypothesis that education of husband is
unrelated to wife’s earnings can be rejected. The size of the effect is about
0.0178, which implies that if the husband has one more year of schooling,
his wife’s earnings would increase by about 1.78 percent holding constant
other factors in the model. The magnitude of the effect increases by about
0.4 percent from 03-04 period to 13-14 period. Both the estimated effect
of interest and the estimated change of the effect over time are significant
at 1% significance level.
In previous studies, the size of the benefit of the wife’s education
was about 1.5-4%. My estimation of the benefit of the husband’s education
falls into this range, suggesting that the effect of spousal education on
one’s own earnings is almost symmetrical. Previous studies mostly focus
on the effect from wife to husband and conclude that the wife’s education
provides substantial labor-market benefits to the family beyond increments
to her own earnings. Male dominance in society is assumed when such
studies were conducted. However, female labor force participation rate
has dramatically increased over the past several decades, and females are
playing increasingly significant roles in our society. With respect to this
contemporary context, my estimation result provides evidence for such
symmetrical effect, as the size of the effect from wife to husband is about
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the same as from husband to wife. The slight increase of the effect may
suggest that husbands play increasingly important role in contributing
to their wives’ human capital accumulation. Females are taking more
advantage of their marriage than ten years ago.
As expected, Table 2 shows that a woman’s own educational
attainment is a significant predictor of her earnings. The rate of return to
a high school degree is about 36%. The return to some college is larger,
about 53.6%. The largest rates of return are for wives with college degrees
or higher. The return to a college degree is about 84.5%, and the return
to post-college schooling is around 108.4%. However, the issue here is
that the estimated returns to education are higher than those in previous
studies. The potential reasons will be discussed later in this section. Other
variables also have the expected signs. The return to additional years of
experience is positive and significant, but declines with age, as the sign
of the coefficient for the experience squared variable is negative. White
females earn more than non-white females. Workers in the East and West
earn more than workers in the Midwest and South. The location of the
household also has substantial impact on the wife’s earnings, as women
who live in urban areas earn about 20% more than women who live in
rural areas.
Table 3 reports the results for the model using the sub-sample of
wives and husbands who are more than 5 years apart in age. As discussed
in the model development section, the purpose of using this sub-sample
is to control for the assortative mating effect. This sub sample represents
couples who are less likely to have met each other either in high school
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or college. The correlation of the husband’s education and his wife’s
earnings remains positive and significant in this case. The size of the
benefit of husband’s education is slightly higher using this sub-sample.
The magnitudes of the coefficients on the wife’s own education are about
the same. There is less evidence for the earning premium of being a white,
as the coefficient is only significant at 10% level. Also, the change of the
benefit of husband’s education increases to about 0.6 percent, but it’s only
significant at 10% level.
Table 3. Regression of log of wife’s annual earnings using a sub-sample
of couples who are more than 5 years apart in age.
Independent Variables

Coefficients(robust Std. Err.)

Husband’s Education

0 .021***
(0.0034)

Wife’s Characteristics:
High school graduate

0.350***
(0.031)

Some college

0.537***
(0.033)

College graduate

0.831***
(0.035)

Graduate/Professional school

1.13***

Experience

0.034***

(0.038)
(0.003)
Experience squared

-0.0006***
(0.00007)

White

0.060*
(0.017)

Urban location

0.202***

Midwest

-0.103***

(0.007)
(0.021)
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West

-0.051**

South

-0.057***

(0.021)
(0.019)
Year 2013&2014

-0.015**
(0.007)

Husband’ s schooling* Year 2013&2014

0.006*
(0.003)

Adjusted R-squared

0.208
11,285

n
***Significant at the 0.01 level
**Significant at the 0.05 level
*Significant at the 0.10 level

Concerned about the ability of the model to address the
research question, I run several diagnostic tests to check the GaussMarkov assumptions for OLS regression. Issues of heteroskedasticity
were present in the model, as evidenced by the Breusch-Pagan Test and
White’s Test for heteroskedasticity. In response, I employ robust standard
errors. Additionally, vif test is used to test for multicollinearity. Except
the interaction term, experience and experience squared, all other five
variables have vif values smaller than 5, which indicates there is evidence
of multicollinearity. Lastly, the p-value of the Ramsey RESET test is about
0.31, so the null hypothesis is not rejected, suggesting that there is no
evidence of functional form misspecification.
Although the coefficient estimate of the key independent variable,
husband’s education, is significant and consistent with other studies, there
are still some issues associated with the model and estimation result. The
estimated returns to one’s own education in my result are substantially
higher than those in previous study. In Jepsen’s (2005) study, she found
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that the return to each level of education is larger in 2000 than in 1960;
and the return to a high school degree ranges from 12 to 17%, the return
to some college ranges from 19 to 27%, the return to a college degree
increases from 38 to 60%, and the return to graduate or professional
degree increases from 55 to 98%. One reason might be that returns to
education increase over time. Other studies have found increasing returns
to education over time. For example, Levy and Murnane(1992) find that
returns to education increased from 1960 to 1990 for both men and women.
Using more up-to-date data, there are potential increases in the returns to
one’s own education in my regression result. Another reason could be that
there is still omitted variable bias in the model. When modeling wife’s
own education as several dummy variables, they would not only reflect
the returns to different levels of education attainment, but also pick up the
effects of signaling one’s ability. As discussed above, one drawback of
this data set is the lack of proxy variables for one’s ability. Then, without
explicitly controlling for the wife’s own ability, the dummy variables pick
up some of the effect of the wife’s ability. Regarding the size of the effect
of spousal education, this omitted variable problem seems have very little
impact on the estimation of my interest of study. This happens because
one’s own education is more associated with one’s own unobserved
ability or family background than spousal education, and therefore we see
potential positively biased estimates of the returns to own education.
Another limitation is that my method of using a sub-sample may not
successfully differentiate between cross-productivity effect and martial
sorting effect. The coefficient estimate of husband’s education in the
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sub-sample is not statistically different from that in the full sample. The
indifferent results have two underlying explanations. If martial sorting
effect does exist, then after controlling for it, the size of the coefficient
estimate is likely to decrease as only cross-productivity effect presents.
Under the assumption of having successfully controlled for marital sorting
effect, the indifferent results may disprove the existence of marital sorting
effect. Another explanation for the indifferent results is that using the subsample is not sufficient for teasing out all the assortative mating effect. It
only excludes observations with higher potential of having such effect, but
the remaining observations may still have both effects. Among all previous
studies of related topics, only Huang et al.(2009) empirically distinguish
between the cross-productivity and mating effects. Their successful
differentiation between the two effects is due to using unique twins data
they collected from urban China. However, without such unique data, one
can hardly distinguish between the two effects. My approach here can only
bring some evidence to bear on this issue.

VI.

Conclusion
In this paper, I analyzed the relationship between husband’s

education and his wife’s earnings. According to human capital theory,
spousal education helps an individual accumulate human capital and
increase earnings. The alternative explanation is the assortative mating
effect in the marriage market; that is, those who marry well-educated
people are of higher ability. Using data from the CPS, I estimate my
hypothesis with the OLS wage model. The result suggests there is strong
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evidence for the positive effect of husband’s education on his wife’s
earnings. Using the original regression model, I consider a sub-sample
that is designed to restrict the effects of positive assortative mating. The
result of this regression is consistent with the results from the full sample.
However, omitted variable bias still presents in the model as the use of CPS
data cannot effectively control for one’s unobserved ability. Moreover, my
approach may not fully distinguish between the cross-productivity and
marital-sorting effects. Further research concerning this topic may need to
find a more effective way to differentiate between the two effects.
In this article, a potential channel of post-school human capital
acquisition, learning within marriage, is proposed. The finding that
spousal education has effect on one’s own earnings could expand our
understanding of the theories of human capital, marriage, and the family.
Labor-market benefits to women appear to be associated with their
marrying well-educated men. These benefits have implications not only
for women’s earnings but also for the considerations of future marriage
partner choice.
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Do Living Wages alter the Effect of the Minimum Wage
on Income Inequality?
by Ben Litwin
Anker (2006) proposed a new methodology for calculating the
living wage in countries around the world. By looking at OECD nations
between 2000-2010, we look to see if countries with a national minimum
wage higher than this living wage value see a notable difference in the
effect of the minimum wage on income inequality. Our results show that
countries with the minimum wage higher than the living wage value do see
lower inequality, although there is a key value of the minimum wage, at
which countries start to see disemployment effects that increase inequality.
This paper will focus on the question, does setting the minimum
wage equal to or above the living wage impact income inequality? Many
people agree that the idea behind the minimum wage is to reduce the
poverty rate. Most minimum wage legislation and regulations focus on
the idea that those who work, should be able to provide for themselves
and their families.1 This brings up the idea of a living wage, which is the
wage that would be able to sustain a person at the lowest standards for an
area. Richard Anker (2006) presented a new methodology for calculating
the living wage in nations across the world by taking the poverty line in
a country, and dividing it by the total hours the average person in that
country works, along with accounting for average workers per household,
and then adding 10 percent of that value to account for sustainability in the
case of unforseen expenses.2 To test this model, we will include it into the

1

2

Anker, Richard, 2006, “Living Wages Around the World: A New Methodology and Internationally
Comparable Estimates” International Labour Review 145 (4): 309-10
Ibid., 318
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methods of previous research into the effect of the real minimum wage on
income inequality. One of the main models used to look at this relationship
is the one presented by John DiNardo, Nicole Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux
(1996) who looked at wage differentials and saw how the decline in the
real value of the minimum wage increased inequality.3
The next section of the paper will look at previous research, not
only going more in depth about the results of Anker (2006) and DiNardo
et al. (1996), but also more theories behind why the minimum wage could
affect income inequality and how the living wage is added into the mix.
This will be followed by a section about the methodological plan of this
paper, including selection of explanatory, dependent, and control variables.
The third section will look at the results of the models, and finally the last
section will be a discussion about these results and concluding remarks.

Previous Research
One of the first models to show the effect of the real minimum
wage on income inequality was presented by John DiNardo, Nicole Fortin,
and Thomas Lemieux (1996) who used a Kernel density function. With the
density function, they were able to see that there was a large compression
of data at the minimum wage value, implying that the spread of income
was being held up at the bottom by the minimum wage.4 DiNardo et al.
compared the wage differentials for the 10th and 90th percentiles and the
10th and 50th percentiles, and looked at their change from 1979 to 1988 as
3

4

DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. “Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution
of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach.” Econometrica 64 (5): 1002
Ibid., 1002
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the real value of the minimum wage dropped by 27 percent.5 They found
that just for the wage differentials in men, “the minimum wage explains
25 percent of the change in the 10-90 differential [and] 66 percent of the
change in the 10-50 differential.”6 These values are even greater when
looking at the results presented about women. By using similar methods,
we will be able to see if this relationship holds on the international level
and is affected by the living wage.
The main theory to explain the relationship between the minimum
wage and income inequality is that the minimum wage is a tool for the
redistribution of income. Richard Freeman (1996) lays out this theory
by showing how other people and corporations pay for higher minimum
wages.7 The theory presented is that there are three different groups that
give up part of their wealth to help pay for an increase in the minimum wage,
the consumers who pay for goods and services produced by minimum wage
workers, the stakeholders in businesses that pay the minimum wage, and
low wage workers that lose their jobs due to the higher wages.8 Although
the basic economic theory, such as what is discussed by Scott Adams and
David Neumark (2003), would suggest that raising the minimum wage
would act as a price floor on labor and reduce its demand, Freeman shows
that previous research on employment effects of actual increases to the
minimum wage in the United States and the United Kingdom have shown
the elasticity of demand for minimum wage workers to be around zero.9
5
6
7
8
9
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Therefore, the groups that mainly pay for higher minimum wages are the
consumers and the businesses. This would show that, in theory, increases
in the minimum wages take money from some people and redistribute it to
others, causing a decrease in income inequality.
David Card and Alan Krueger (1995) also discuss the effect of the
minimum wage on the distribution of wages in chapter nine of their book
Myth and Measurement. After briefly mentioning that recent labor market
data gives no support to the standard economic theory that discusses the
disemployment effects of the minimum wage, Card and Krueger show
how increases in the federal minimum wage halt and temporarily reverse
the trend of growing income inequality in the United Sates over the last 30
years.10 The effects are only temporary, since in years after the minimum
wage increases, the wage gap continues to rise again. Card and Krueger
also warn that these changes to the level of income inequality are small
since these increases tend to only increase the incomes of the lowestpaid workers by a fairly small amount, usually around 10-15 percent.11
Therefore the effects tend to seem small, although they are statistically
significant.
The other main theory for how the minimum wage affects income
inequality is presented by Oren Levin-Waldman (2001) and deals with the
overall wage structure. The idea behind his argument is that increases in
the minimum wage apply upwards pressure on other low-wages, even if
10

11
12
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they are not directly affected by the statutory increase.12 By increasing
the wages at the lower end of the spectrum, while not having an effect on
higher wages, the minimum wage closes the wage gap, thereby reducing
income inequality.
Looking more into the living wage, Benjamin Page and James
Simmons (2000) present an argument in their book, What Government Can
Do, that focuses on cities across the United States, such as Baltimore, New
York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, and Milwaukee, all of which have
passed living wage laws requiring companies with government contracts
to pay their employees higher wages so that the workers do not live below
the poverty line.13 The idea behind these living wage laws is that full time
employees should not be living in poverty and minimum wages should
be high enough to reduce poverty levels. Page and Simmons however do
warn that minimum wages that are too high could possibly have a negative
impact on employment and economic growth, but so far there has not been
a situation among areas with living wage laws where this seems to have
happened. All living wage levels have stayed “within the modest ranges”
so that they can have “a positive contribution to the average incomes of
poor Americans.”14
The model of the living wage presented by Anker (2006) is shown
in the equation below.
Poverty Line
Hours worked
Living Wage= 			
+10%
Workers per household
13

14
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Anker presents this as a suitable model to find a standard way of
calculating a living wage since the living wage is meant to be an “hourly
wage rate required to support a household at the poverty line.”15 Using this
definition, Anker created the model being used along with factoring in an
additional ten percent to account for unforseen costs or personal savings
for bigger purchases.16 Anker does discuss whether to use one worker
per household or two, since the traditional family includes two working
adults, but many low-income families only have one working adult due to
the cost of childcare.17 Therefore we will look at the model using both one
worker per family and two workers per family. Finally there are various
ways to calculate the poverty line. For a basic measure, we will be using
the World Bank’s relative poverty line, which is simply 50 percent of the
country’s mean income.18 Although this is not the most exact measure of
poverty, it will be sufficient to calculate a living wage.

Methodological Plan and Data
Using the formula for the living wage previously shown, we will
be able to calculate the living wage for OECD nations and then compare
this value to the actual federal minimum wage in these countries. This
will divide OECD nations into two groups, countries with the minimum
wage below the living wage, and countries with the minimum wage at or
above the living wage. From this comparison we will be able to create a
15
16
17
18
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dummy variable equal to 1 if the minimum wage is at or above the living
wage and 0 if the minimum wage is below the living wage. This will lead
to the following regression.

WDit=β0+β1 MWit+β2 LWit+β3 MWLWit+X+u

Where WD is the wage differential being measured, MW is the minimum
wage, LW is the dummy variable for whether or not the minimum wage is
at or above the living wage, and finally there is an interaction term to see
if the effects of the minimum wage on the income inequality in countries
where the minimum wage is above the living wage is different from other
countries. X represents all other control factors that will be in the model, u
is the error term, and i represents the different countries while t represents
the different years.
The control factors being used will be modelled after the research
of Ximing Wu, Jeffrey Perloff, and Amos Golan (2006) who show the
effect of different governmental policies on income inequality in urban
and rural areas.19 Since Wu et al. found a statistically significant difference
between urban and rural populations, we will use this as one of our controls,
along with the percentage of the population in different age groups, social
expenditure, the national GDP, and the unemployment rate.20 Finally,
Card and Krueger (1995) found that the effect that the minimum wage
has on income inequality significantly depends on the percentage of the
population that would be affected by a minimum wage increase.21 To
19

20

21
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account for this, we will also use the percentage of the population below
the poverty line.
As stated earlier, this model will be run using calculations for the
living wage with one and two workers per family since the traditional
family includes two working members, while many low-income families
only have one worker due to the cost of child care. We will also be
running separate regressions for the wage differentials for the 90th and
10th percentiles to measure full inequality, and 50th and 10th percentiles to
measure lower tail inequality. This comes from the methods of DiNardo
et al. (1996) since they not only found a compression of wages at the
lower tail of the density function, but also big changes in the effect of the
minimum wage when just looking at the lower end of the spectrum.22
The data for this research will be collected from the OECD
database for all variables except for the percentage of the population
that lives in urban environments, since the OECD does not keep track of
that data. Therefore urban population percentage data will come from
the World Bank’s database. We will be looking at data from the years
2000-2010 since many of the variables being observed do not have very
consistent data points before that period, and some variables do not have
any data reported after 2010. Finally, only 25 of the 34 OECD countries
have been included in this study since the OECD does not have minimum
wage values for the other nine. Therefore Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland will not be

22
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included in this study due to the inability to compare their minimum wages
with the living wage values calculated for them.
We have two main hypotheses for this model. The first hypothesis
is that the minimum wage will help reduce income inequality. This is due
to the redistributive effects of the minimum wage. Higher minimum wages
will lead to more wealth being taken from consumers and businesses, and
given to low-income workers, which would result in lower inequality. The
second hypothesis is that minimum wages at or above the living wage
will have a significantly higher effect on reducing income inequality than
countries with lower minimum wages. This is somewhat an extension
of the first hypothesis since the countries with minimum wages above
their living wage value will have higher minimum wages, but also this
hypothesis would provide evidence that the formula for the living wage
created by Anker (2006) would be an effective calculation that showed
how living wages help improve the relative standard of living for lowincome workers in a particular country.

Results
By running the regression for the 90-10 wage differential using
panel data methods to control for country and time fixed effects, we find
the results shown in table 1. The first column represents the values when
the regression is run using one working family member and the second
column shows two working family members.
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Table 1.
90-10 percentile wage differentials on variables altering
calculations for the living wage between one and two
working adults.
One working adult
Minimum Wage

Two working adults

-0.0102

-0.0935**

Living Wage Dummy

-0.0000414

-0.350***

Min Wage∙Living Wage Dummy

-0.000798

0.0768**

0.00002

0.000038

Social Expenditures
Urban Population
GDP

-0.00262

-0.00295

0.0000001****

0.0000000885***

Unemployment Rate

0.0234***

0.0154*

Poverty Rate

0.202****

0.202****

Population Under 18

3.70*

3.67*

Population 18-40

-0.662

-0.588

Population 41-50

-3.55

-4.76*

Population 51-65

-4.079

-4.55

Population 66-75

4.59

3.075

Population 76 and over

-3.34

-2.88

Constant

2.30*

2.95**

*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01****p<0.001
This model shows that the effects of the minimum wage and living
wage on income inequality, as measured by the wage differential between
the 90th and 10th percentiles, is highly significant when calculating the living
wage using two working adults in the house, while they are not significant
when the living wage is calculated using one working adult. Looking closer
at the data, this relationship could stem from the fact that there are very
few observations where the minimum wage is equal to or higher than the
one working adult living wage. Therefore, it is more accurate to look at
the relationship while using the two working adult model. This provides
evidence that not only do higher minimum wages significantly reduce
overall income inequality, but also that the group of countries with minimum
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wages at or above the two working adult living wage have significantly less
inequality, but the minimum wage is less effective at reducing inequality
in these countries, thereby showing that at a certain level, these higher
minimum wages will start increasing inequality, as shown by the positive
estimate on the interaction term. This was accurately predicted by Page and
Simmons (2000), since minimum wages higher than a certain amount could
start to have a stronger disemployment effect than redistribution effect.23
Also, although many of the control variables do not appear to be significant,
we found the joint significance of the control variables related to economic
conditions (social expenditures, urban population, GDP, unemployment
rate, and poverty rate) to be highly significant and the joint significance of
the age variables to be highly significant.
Now that we see the influence of the minimum wage on income
inequality for the whole population, we can look at the relationship when
only looking at the lower tail of the income distribution. DiNardo et al.
(1996) found that the minimum wage had a significant effect on overall
inequality, but for the lower end of the wage spectrum, changes in the real
minimum wage accounted for the overwhelming majority of changes in
inequality for men, women, and pooled genders.24 Expanding on these
results, we can see how adding in the effects of a living wage changes this
significance, results for which are shown in table 2. Again, the control
variables are all jointly significant by group (economic conditions and
age variables) even though many of these variables are individually not
significant.
23
24
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Table 2.
50-10 percentile wage differential on variables altering
calculations for the living wage between one and two
working adults.
One working adult
Minimum Wage
Living Wage Dummy
Min Wage∙Living Wage Dummy
Social Expenditures
Urban Population
GDP
Unemployment Rate
Poverty Rate
Population Under 18

Two working adults

-0.0111*

-0.081*

0.064

-0.0505

-0.00498

0.0117

0.00000778

0.00000784

-0.000703

-0.000781

0.00000000748

0.00000000916*

0.00166

0.000954

0.077****

0.0772****

1.83***

1.69***

Population 18-40

-0.265

-0.268

Population 41-50

0.0574

-0.075

Population 51-65

0.981

0.798

Population 66-75

0.943

0.844

Population 76 and over

0.0129

-0.126

Constant

0.729*

0.852**

*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01****p<0.001
We still see the relationship found by DiNardo et al. (1996) since the real
value of the minimum wage does have a statistically significant effect on
this low tail wage differential. That being said, this relationship is only
significant at the 10 percent level, which brings to question how they found
over two thirds of the change in this wage differential to be a result of the
falling value of the minimum wage. As for the effects of the living wage
on the lower end of the income distribution, this data does not provide
significant evidence that there is a change in the effect of the minimum
wage on inequality when the minimum wage is at or higher than the living
wage. This is further enhanced by the evidence shown that increases in the
minimum wage do not affect the countries that fit into the living wage group
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differently than the countries that do not. Another important observation
to make is that, unlike with the 90-10 percentile wage differential, there
is not a difference in significance when comparing the one working adult
model to the two working adult model. Both show the minimum wage to
be statistically significant, but not the living wage nor the interaction term.
Finally since we did find results that were less significant than
those presented in the paper by DiNardo et al. (1996), this brings up the
question of whether the different data sets have an effect (since they looked
at the differences between the 50 states while we compared different
OECD countries) or is adding the living wage variable and the interaction
term into the equation changing the results. In order to see this, we run the
regression without either of the variables that deal with the living wage,
the results for which are found in table 3.
Table 3.
Both wage differential models without the living wage
related variables
Minimum Wage
Social Expenditures
Urban Population
GDP

90-10 differential

50-10 differential

-0.0024

-0.0143***

-0.00000469

0.0000108

0.00558

-0.000322

0.000000107****

0.00000000968**

Unemployment Rate

0.0249***

0.00114

Poverty Rate

0.208****

0.0742****

Population Under 18
Population 18-40

3.32*

1.86****

0.000000337****

-0.0000000337

Population 41-50

-2.88

0.0866

Population 51-65

-1.98

1.116*

Population 66-75

4.19

1.65**

Population 76 and over
Constant

-4.87*

-0.0657

1.31

0.572**

*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01****p<0.001
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These results are very interesting, since the effect of the minimum
wage on income inequality without using the living wage related variables
becomes extremely more significant for the lower tail of the income
distribution, but for overall distribution, the effect of the minimum wage
becomes less significant without considering the living wage.

This

ambiguously answers why some of the results seen here are different than
those observed by DiNardo et al. since the lower tail differential would
state that including the living wage would be creating bias in the estimates
and making the minimum wage become less significant, while the full
income distribution differential would show that accounting for the living
wage would help eliminate bias and show that changes in the real value of
the minimum wage do affect income inequality.

Conclusion
The model presented by Anker (2006) for calculating the living
wage does prove to show that there is a reduction in overall income
inequality when a country sets its minimum wage equal to or higher than
this value. That being said, this result only occurs when the living wage
is calculated using the traditional two workers per family, as opposed
to a one worker family which can be typically found in low-income
households. However, the most likely explanation for this variation is that
of the 231 observed minimum wages, 58.44 percent of them are above the
living wage when calculated using two workers, while only 4.33 percent
of them are above the living wage when calculated for one worker. This
would show that there is probably not enough data to properly estimate
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the effects of the one worker living wage on income inequality, since the
calculation for one worker living wage produces a higher living wage,
therefore countries that fall into the living wage category for one worker
would have higher minimum wages. Based on all other findings, these
extremely high minimum wages should produce even lower inequality,
but the results were not significant. Finding more data that would include
more observations for countries with minimum wages higher than the one
worker living wage would provide for a more accurate estimation of the
relationship and would be excellent for further research in to the subject.
As for the hypothesis that stated the minimum wage helps to reduce
income inequality, we find that there is significant evidence to support
this. Except for two of them, all of the regressions that were ran provide
statistically significant estimations that show the negative relationship
between the real value of the minimum wage and income inequality. The
two that do not provide evidence supporting this hypothesis are the model
that regressed the 90-10 differential on the one worker living wage (which
was discussed earlier as to why these results could be biased due to a lack
of observations) and the model that used the 90-10 differential but did not
include living wage related variables. Although there is not a good theory
as to why the second regression mentioned here provides different results,
this one model should not disprove the findings that the minimum wage
does reduce income inequality.
Our hypothesis that relates to the effect of the living wage is shown
to be true for when looking at the full income distribution, but not when
only looking at the lower tail distribution. Again, this is only looking at
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the two worker living wage model. This shows that Anker’s calculation
for a living wage does lead to an effective estimate of the living wage since
countries that have minimum wages at or above this level prove to have less
income inequality, even though increases to the real value of the minimum
wage past a certain level will eventually start to increase inequality in
these countries due to disemployment effects of minimum wages that are
too high. The fact that the estimate for the living wage’s effect on the
distribution of low tail incomes is not statistically significant does not
disprove this hypothesis, but instead shows that minimum wage increase
do not significantly change the income of minimum wage workers relative
to other low wage workers. This could be a result of a spillover effect that
were discussed earlier in the theory presented by Levin-Waldman (2001),
which stated that “an increase in the minimum wage could exert an upward
pressure on the wages of those earning above the new minimum wage.”25
Looking at the spillover effects of the minimum wage and seeing how they
affect the lower tail of the income distribution would provide a good area
for further research into this subject.
Overall, setting the minimum wage at or above the living wage
does reduce income inequality. The policy implications of this would
be that countries raising their minimum wages to be equal to the living
wages calculated using Anker’s model would help fight the rising
income inequality. The idea is very simple, since the main objective of
most minimum wage legislation, as stated earlier, is to reduce poverty.

25
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Therefore, setting the minimum wage at a level that is found using the
poverty line, as is done in the model presented by Anker (2006), would
help to reduce poverty and inequality.
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Nominal GDP Targeting: A Policy Recommendation to
Meet the Fed’s Dual Mandate.
A Fed Challenge Response Paper: Fall 2014
By R. Shaw Bridges III
Abstract:
This paper was written in early December 2014 in response to the Federal
Reserve Challenge Team’s argument for a regime change in the Federal
Reserve to nominal GDP targeting as the appropriate policy to return
the U.S. economy to long-term sustainable economic growth. After the
2007 recession, the FOMC took extraordinary measures to minimize the
collateral damage caused by bank balance sheets weighed down with
mortgage-backed securities and other below-investment grade assets.
The periodic “stress tests” and use of emergency lending facilities were
historically unprecedented, however, the economy six years later was still
growing slowly in part due to market uncertainty with FOMC forward
guidance policy. This paper argues that the Fed is justified in using a policy
that risks short-term rapid inflation in order to meet the “dual mandate” of
full employment and price stability, and to prevent cyclical unemployment
in the economy from deteriorating into structural unemployment.
In 2007, the United States suffered the worst economic downturn
in recent memory. In response, risk-averse businesses and consumers have
withdrawn from investment and spending in order to pay off outstanding
debts. This process of deleveraging, while focused primarily in the
housing sector, has not only slowed economic growth in the recovery, but
has also led to persistently low rates of labor force participation as well
as inflation (Wenli Li and Susheela Patwari 2012, 9, and Fed Challenge
Manuscript (FCM) 2014). The initial measures the FOMC took to avert an
economic depression during the recession, which included the opening of
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emergency lending facilities and the implementation of periodic stress tests
of bank balance sheets, were extraordinary, and until this disaster struck,
historically unprecedented (Ben Bernanke 2012, 2). Now approaching six
years into the official period of recovery with interest rates still at the zero
lower bound, analysts are divided over their interpretations of relevant
economic metrics, and whether or not they indicate the much-desired
self-sustainable economic growth needed to return to stable price levels
and labor market conditions. This disagreement over interpretations of
economic metrics in different sectors has only exacerbated uncertainty in
financial markets, evidence for which has become increasingly apparent
with threats of bond-market sell-offs in anticipation of Fed Chair Janet
Yellen’s speeches after the monthly meetings of the FOMC (Gavin Davies
2014).
In his address to the NABE Policy Conference late in February,
economist Lawrence Summers stated aptly that today, monetary policy
experts “wish for the problem of minimizing fluctuations around a
satisfactory trend” (Lawrence H. Summers 2014, 65). Yet, as economist
Michael Woodford maintains, if policy-makers fail to act decisively and
with the utmost transparency, there is a distinctive risk this “wish” for real
growth and a return to full employment will not be granted anytime soon
(Michael Woodford interview, 2014). In order to effectively communicate
monetary policy in the near future, it is this author’s contention that a
regime change to nominal GDP targeting is needed [See Figure 1]. In this
paper, I argue this suggested deviation from the current forward guidance
policy is necessary to meet the dual mandate of full employment and price
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stability. Not only does this policy allow the Federal Reserve to firmly
commit to economic recovery in the short term, but it also eliminates
instability associated with uncertainty over the current ambiguity regarding
the decision to raise interest rates. While short-term rapid inflation is a risk,
however, prolonged economic stagnation can lead to a deterioration of
cyclical into structural unemployment, which produces long run hysteresis
in the economy. This real risk is sufficient justification for the adoption of
this bold policy measure.

U.S. Economy After the Recovery
The Gettysburg College Federal Reserve Challenge Team’s
argument for nominal GDP targeting is reliant on several historical metrics
that over the past several years have caused the Federal Reserve to adjust
downward its estimates of future real growth. According to the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, the most recent estimate in the third quarter of
2014 has revised real GDP upward to 3.9% from the previous advance
estimate of 3.5%. This data point reflects a fall in the percentage change
from last quarter, due to a downturn in private inventory investment and
a deceleration in exports, investment spending, personal consumption
expenditures, which was offset by an 10% increase in federal government
consumption expenditure and gross investment (Lisa Mataloni, et. al.
2014). Despite the positive upward revision approaching the 4.6% growth
in the second quarter, our Fed Challenge team was skeptical that the nearly
4.0% growth seen in these last two quarters is sustainable. The strong
growth we have been experiencing over the past two quarters is a transitory
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phenomenon due to a temporary decrease in oil and gas prices. Although
consumers will have more to spend in the short-term, there is little reason
to expect this level of growth to continue indefinitely (Patricia Cohen
2014). Yet, even if the BEA is now observing evidence of significant real
growth, the persistent underperformance of the economy in the years since
2007 has led analysts at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to revise
downward estimates of potential GDP [Figure 2] (FCM 2014). According
to these estimates, Lawrence Summers argues, economists at the CBO
believe we can return to a steady trend in growth, however, the leisurely
speed of the recovery has caused them to reevaluate both the size of the
capital stock and sustainable labor input (Lawrence H. Summers 2014,
66). These revisions have had the perhaps unintended affect of overstating
the incremental upward movements in GDP analysts have observed in the
last two quarters. The period of economic recovery we are experiencing
has not involved a return of GDP to its potential.
This need for growth in excess of current trends is further
exacerbated by estimates of labor force participation and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics estimates of unemployment. Despite the recent positive
indication of a drop in unemployment to 5.8%, a breakdown of this metric
reveals a still volatile labor market [Figure 3] (BLS employment summary
2014). Both long-term unemployed and civilian labor force participation
have been mostly constant since April, and still seven million are employed
part-time out of necessity, possibly due to a skills mismatch [Figure 4]
(ibid). Furthermore, while employment has shown marginal growth
in health and food services industries, financial, mining and logging,
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information, wholesale trade, and government employment numbers have
largely remained unchanged month to month (ibid.). As our team indicates,
the revision to 5.8% places us at the high end of the bracketed region of
unemployment estimates for October between 5.2 and 5.8 as depicted in
Figure 4. Contrary to the narrative of improvement and progress toward
full employment, the Fed Challenge team argued that the consistently slow
restoration of labor force participation indicates just the opposite. They
cited November estimates of labor force participation at 62.8% of the
population, which shows little improvement from 63% in September this
year. Likewise, in their report for the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Stephanie Aaronson and colleagues indicated that the employment to
population ratio (currently at 59.2%) is still only little over a half percentage
point higher than the low in the recovery period (Stephanie Aaronson et.
al., 2014, 2). Labor force participation changes in response to factors such
as declining market opportunities, wage growth, import competition, and
retirement, under good economic conditions (ibid., 9, 12). Aaronson and
colleagues indicates many participants dropping out of the labor force
temporarily, such as young people enrolling in higher education programs,
or discouraged workers, may have done so in response to slack in the labor
market, and will likely return once conditions improve (ibid., 14). Using
panel data of state level unemployment and LFP, the authors of this study
found that between .25 and 1% of the decline in labor force participation
was explained by cyclical effects. Yet, if a return of employment numbers
an job growth is persistently slow, there is a risk that previously qualified
workers will lose too much of their human capital. These authors reveal
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cyclical pressures on employment and highering during the post-recession
economic recovery, and more importantly, that there are still thousands of
discouraged workers searching for employment opportunities (ibid., 224).
The Fed challenge team argued against economists who maintain
that the currently low employment numbers in the U.S. are due primarily
to pre-recession structural changes. Economists who argue that cyclical
pressures often mask changes to the long-term composition of the
unemployment rate have interpreted the Beveridge curve as evidence
of structural unemployment. Peter Diamond and Aysegul Sahin’s recent
analysis of the “Beveridge curve” over past recessionary periods in the
business cycle contradicts this narrative of structural unemployment in the
labor market (Peter A. Diamond and Aysegul Sahin 2014). They reveal
instead that the underlying relationship between the job vacancy and
unemployment rates indicated by the curve reveals historically consistent
outward movements following recessionary periods. These outward shifts
suggest that firms are reluctant to resume a steady pace of new employee
hires out of the labor force following a dip in production (ibid.). Whether
due to the increased scrupulousness of firms selecting between potential
employees from an unusually high population of qualified unemployed
workers, or due to the continuation of the firm and household deleveraging
process, firms are not hiring at high enough rates to put downward pressure
on wages. This is evident from wage growth indicators such as average
nominal hourly earnings, which is currently hovering at around 2.2 percent
growth this past year [See Figure 5].
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Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen indicates that while nominal
wages have grown at a 2% rate for several years, in real terms wages
have been flat (Janet Yellen Aug. 2014, 9). She argues this slow real wage
growth will not exert “any meaningful upward pressure on inflation,”
which means nominal wages will not rise for some time after employment
starts to pick up (ibid). As our Fed Challenge team argued, this lack of
inflationary pressure on wages will likely persist in foreseeable future,
especially since oil prices, which recently dropped as low as $65.9 per
barrel at the end of November, has and will contribute to even lower longterm inflation [Figure 6]. Lower energy prices, while only temporarily
putting downward pressure on inflation, have also led to a temporary
surge in GDP growth that will only last as long as oil prices remain
depressed (Jonathan Spicer and Rodrigo Campos 2014). In the aftermath
of the recession, firms were unable to lower wages due to “downward
nominal wage rigidity,” so layoffs were preferable. Now with economic
conditions improving, firms have a larger pool of job applicants, including
but not limited to the previously laid off workers (Janet Yellen 2014, 10).
Therefore, these metrics collectively indicate a persistently sluggish labor
market, which is certainly not creating the necessary demand for more
workers to meet the Federal Reserve’s mandate of full employment (FCM
2014, 2).
In the years since the Great Recession, much analytical work has
been done to grasp the economic implications of the process of household
and firm deleveraging mentioned above. There has been a significant and
steady downward trend in percentage of debt service payments to disposable
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income. This downward trend shows that households are, as of early this
year, continuing the process of deleveraging debts, such as paying down
old household mortgages. According to Wenli Li and Susheela Patwari,
the ratio of household credit to disposable income indicates that, as of
2012, U.S. citizens were only halfway through the process of deleveraging
(2012, 15). The downward trend in the total credit liability as a ratio of
disposable income reveals households are continuing to pay down this
debt-overhang [Figure 7]. Moreover, household savings rates have
remained high since the recession, hovering at around 3% higher than the
low in 2007 [Figure 8]. In their book House of Debt (2014), Atif Mian and
Amir Sufi argue that this process of household deleveraging has led to a
lack of consumption growth, especially in low-income households that
responded to the housing price shock by reducing their MPC (Atif Mian
and Amir Sufi, 2014). Until this debt-overhang is paid down, household
expenditures as a percentage of disposable income will continue to make
an insufficient contribution to consumer spending and by extension GDP
growth. Moreover, as economist Richard Koo has demonstrated, this
process of deleveraging in the United States indicates we are recovering
from a “balance-sheet recession,” which can lead to prolonged deficiency
of aggregate demand (Richard Koo 2011, 1). He argues a policy that sets
a low target for inflation is futile unless households are beginning to halt
the deleveraging process. In the recovery from a balance sheet recession,
aggregate demand is responsive to asset price changes, and not to relative
changes in consumer prices (ibid). As the Fed Challenge team clarifies,
however, the housing market as indicated under the Case-Shiller Home
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Price Index, has recovered slightly this past year [Figure 9]. This is a
positive indicator that a pick-up in consumer demand is possible, with a
push from monetary policy-makers. In the next section, I argue the policy
our team recommended supports this much-needed growth back to prerecession trend of GDP.
Moreover, liquidity injections into the banking system have not
increased the lending and borrowing practices of households and banks
necessary to offset the fall in consumer spending. Lenders and borrowers
are still repairing their damaged balance sheets and are hesitant to assume
more debt-obligations due to perceptions of investment risk (ibid).
Firms and households have been forced for years to deleverage their
existing debts, despite interest rates at historic all-time lows. There has
been some concern that banks are more likely to abuse the risk-taking
channel and take on excess amounts of low-quality credit due to relaxed
lending standards associated with future expectations of low interest
rates (Teodora Paligorova et. al., 2012, 25). Yet the deleveraging process
left banks that had damaged balance sheets following the recession with
their hands tied behind their backs, hesitant to lend borrowers. Recently,
however, the number of banks reporting tightening lending standards has
dropped significantly, indicating that lenders are beginning to make loans
to borrowers with potentially poor credit ratings. As the Fed Challenge
team research into the financial sector indicates, there has been a renewal
of levered loans despite the opposition of financial regulators, indicative
of the below investment-grade securities packaged and sold before the
financial crisis.
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Investors will likely sell these leveraged loans with impunity to
clients who in search of cheap, high returns, so long as the Federal Reserve
continues to keep interest rates low [Figure 10] (Peter Eaves 2014). In a
Financial Times article written this September, Tracy Alloway and Gina
Chon indicate more that than a third of loans given out by U.S. banks in
2014 came with leverage exceeding Federal Reserve guidelines, which are
supposed to limit loans to bearing a value no more than 6x a company’s
annual earnings (Tracy Alloway and Gina Chon, 2014). Thus, the “frothy”
growth we have experienced in the financial sector is likely more artificial
and hence unsustainable outside zero-lower bound conditions. Koo argues
that the “trauma” firms and households experience after paying down
the debt-overhang creates an “exit problem” following balance sheet
recessions. This phenomenon has been observable in Japan since the
1990s, where the private sector is borrowing averse, interest rates are at
the zero-lower bound, and government debt as of 2012 was 237 percent
of GDP (Richard Koo 2011, 34). The concurrent volatility of financial
markets and household deleveraging in the United States renders higher
interest rates an impractical Federal Reserve policy in the near future.
Still, expectations of positive economic improvements in the
United States has led both to appreciation of the dollar, and depreciation
of foreign currencies [Figure 11]. Recent developments in foreign markets
suggests that global economic growth may bear down on domestic growth
as well. The Bank of Japan has recently opted to continue another round
of LSAPs indicating efforts to depreciate the Yen. Likewise, ECB banks
of Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland will likely decide to adopt similar
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unconventional policies such as LSAPs to stem the appreciation of the
Euro (Nouriel Roubini 2014). New York Fed President William Dudley
recently commented on Bloomberg that if the dollar appreciates against
these foreign currencies, the result could mean lower net exports and a
subsequent “dampening” of inflation (Alister Bull 2014). In developing
a policy, the Federal Reserve must consider the possibility of external
threats to self-sustainable growth in the coming years, and weigh the risks
of high inflation compared with continued disinflation in the economy.

Defense of Nominal GDP Targeting
This fall, the Gettysburg College Challenge Team offered
what I have maintained was a convincing analysis of the state of U.S.
macroeconomic conditions in the wake of the 2007-9 recession. The U.S.
economy since the Great Recession has been growing at a sluggish pace
resulting in higher labor market slack than indicated by the current 5.8%
unemployment statistic. Moreover, recent data indicators, such as dropping
energy prices and irresponsible financial investment have led to spurious
signs of growth that is unsustainable outside zero-lower bound conditions.
In the past two months, the Federal Reserve has ceased its program of
Large Scale Asset Purchases, leaving forward guidance strategies as our
primary tool to reduce long-term interest rates (FCM 2014, 3). Different
types of forward guidance strategies have been tested over the course of
the recovery, and policy-makers differ in their opinions of its effectiveness.
From Auguest, 2011 to October, 2012, the Federal Reserve tried calendar
based forward guidance, promising to keep the federal funds rate near zero
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until a specified date in the future (ibid.). In December 2012, the Federal
Reserve altered its criteria to data-based forward guidance, by promising
to keep rates at the zero-lower bound until the unemployment rate passed
below the threshold set at 6.5% (ibid., 4). Extensive economic literature
has been amassed analyzing the benefits and drawbacks of both calendar
and data based policy recommendations. There are significant practical
disadvantages of these previous policies that constrain the economy from
generating the growth necessary to avoid the threat of secular stagnation.
I maintain that in order to achieve the growth we require, the Federal
Reserve must adopt a more integrative approach to forward guidance,
which targets nominal GDP instead of inflation.
In the past few years, policy-makers at the Federal Reserve have
concentrated on chasing the simultaneous goals of stronger growth, capacity
utilization, and financial stability, yet as the macro-economic analysis above
reveals, this tripartite objective has become more difficult under zerolower bound conditions (Lawrence H. Summers 2014, 66). As economist
Larry Summers indicates, the economy is today underperforming at the
potential level forecast in 2007 for the year 2014/15, and the improvements
described by the unemployment to population ratio are murky [Figures
1 & 3]. The U.S. economy has made almost no progress returning to
potential output, but Summers argues that declining real interest rates
should concern policy-makers more (ibid., 69). He argues economists
might be observing a period he describes as a “reversal” of Say’s Law, in
which deficient demand yields deficient supply, and that the continuous
lowering of interest rates to supply the labor force with jobs could render
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monetary policy ineffective, and suppress economic growth indefinitely
(ibid., 71). The result of this secular stagnation could eventually lead to
a vast number of unemployable workers and a contraction in productive
capacity, resulting in hysteresis (Matt O’Brien 2014). Moreover, Summers
indicates the historical record suggests financial instability goes handin-hand with periods of growth. In the recovery period of the business
cycle especially, with interest rates at the zero lower bound, stability in
the financial sector becomes harder to achieve in conjunction with strong
growth. Instead of waiting for the economy to grow naturally, policymakers should therefore welcome the inflation necessary to contribute to
meaningful growth in output.
Summers suggests that the increased MPS of households and
firms resulting from changes to income distribution, cash hoarding by
large corporations, and other debt-financed investment demand reducing
activity may have also lowered the natural equilibrium real rate of interest
(Lawrence H. Summers 2014, 69). Likewise, Minneapolis Federal Reserve
President Narayana Kocherlakota argued at the 22nd Annual Hyman P.
Minsky Conference that in the past six years, the U.S. has experienced
changes in demand for safe assets that may persist over the coming
decade (2013, 2). Kocherlakota contends that, given the poor outlook for
employment and prices, the FOMC should lower the real interest rate even
further below the 2007 threshold in order to generate significant growth
(ibid., 6). This growth produced under conditions of low real interest rates
will likely not come without the cost of financial instability that can occur
with “inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened
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merger activity” (ibid., 11). The preponderance of conceivable outcomes
these authors cite suggests the risks associated with generating significant
growth are difficult to avoid under slow recovery conditions.
The recommendation for nominal GDP target in part derives
its strength as a policy from the argument that under current economic
conditions, there is a chance the U.S. could be heading towards secular
stagnation. Summers and Kocherlakota’s analyses in conjunction with
the data our Federal Challenge Panel cited in reference to labor market
conditions and the output gap indicates the risk of prolonged economic
stagnation could lead to a contraction of human capital resulting in
hysteresis. In addition to providing a clear policy criterion both for the
FOMC and financial markets, the nominal GDP target could solve the issue
Summers and Kocherlakota emphasize regarding the real interest rate and
inflation. As Harvard Professor Jeffrey Frankel indicates, a nominal GDP
target guarantees either acceleration in real growth, or that real interest
rates will decline in response to the policy, which will in turn put upward
pressure on aggregate demand (Jeffrey Frankel 2012). If indeed the U.S.
is heading toward similar stagnation to the Japanese economy for the
past two decades, the window for the Federal Reserve to adopt growthsupportive policies is narrowing with each passing year.
Unlike price-level targets, which have been judged to be a similar
objective criterion, a nominal GDP target would provide greater quantitative
gains. According to Jérémie Cohen-Setton et. al. (2013), five years out of
the 2007 recession, the price level was not much lower than it would have
been growing at 2% per year, whereas nominal GDP fell nearly 10%, as
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indicated in Figure 1. They maintain the rise in expected inflation would
thus have been smaller under the price-level targeting regime. Critics such
as Charles Goodhart argue that unlike inflation targeting, however, NGDP
would function poorly as a kind of Taylor rule, since it would entail both
an interest rate as well as an output measure, and thus revisions to NGDP
over time make the risk of overshooting the target at any given interest
rate more volatile. A proponent of this policy innovation, Scott Sumner
argues that unlike inflation targets, an NGDP target would only require
a single estimate of the output gap at the time the target was set, thus
avoiding the constant revisionary estimates to the output gap associated
with “flexible inflation targets” (ibid., bibliography). Although there are
difficulties associated with finding a long-run sustainable trend that would
support the economic environment for employment and growth, as Scott
Sumner argues, it would not be unreasonable to look at what past forecasts
of growth had been prior to the recession as the goal (Scott Sumner 2012,
10). Suppose that the estimate for the growth rate set to reach a nominal
GDP target would overshoot the target if growth accelerated or decelerated
in the near future? The Federal Reserve would only have to make minor
adjustments to forward guidance policy and other similarly influential
policies on future expectations, in order to avoid overshooting the target. In
this way, it would be clear to outside observers what the Federal Reserve’s
future plans for the economy are under all possible scenarios for growth.
Thus, this single criterion communicates the Federal Reserve’s intentions
more efficiently than if continuous revisions were made to policy and
hence future expectations based on an output gap estimate.
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Furthermore, Charles A.E. Goodhart et. al. (2013) argues that a
nominal GDP target policy regime would allow inflation to appear even
more volatile than under price level targeting, because of uncertainty over
long-run sustainable output. Yet as these recent critics of NGDP targets
show, once the Federal Reserve sets the forecast for long-run sustainable
growth at the pre-recession forecast, the Federal Reserve could also deliver
a 2% inflation target at that long-run rate. In order to mitigate the risk of
future adjustments to NGDP, Sumner argues, the Federal Reserve could set
up futures markets and subsidize trading of NGDP futures contracts. This
would have the effect of anchoring investor expectations and forecast the
required monetary base to boost nominal growth, by providing the public
with incentive to return to pre-recession growth trend (Scott Sumner 2011,
17-18). For some at the Federal Reserve, this policy still presents a risk they
are unwilling to take due to the uncertainty of previous forecasts, possibly
due to ex post facto reasons associated with growth estimates prior to the
recession. Scholars have misconstrued the majority of these components
of NGDP targets as drawbacks that impede its implementation, and not as
strengths, or at least net advantages over and above current inflation target
policy. As it stands, our Team’s current recommendation inadequately
addresses these concerns and should be changed if more members of the
Federal Reserve are one day to be swayed to by our assessment.
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Conclusion
The recommendation our panel made to the Federal Reserve
is necessary to provide the much-needed future growth our economy
needs to avoid secular stagnation. The current growth trends in the U.S.
economy are indicative of slow growth from the recession of 2007-9,
which will lead to persistently low labor force participation. Likewise,
financial stability can only be achieved in strong growth conditions,
once the Federal Reserve is able to raise interest rates without disrupting
the process of deleveraging and subsequent growth in investment and
consumer expenditure [Figure 12]. The sooner the Federal Reserve can
return to pre-recession long-run sustainable growth trends the better. By
setting a nominal GDP target, the Federal Reserve would be making a
commitment to return the economy back to full employment levels before
unemployed citizens of the United States become unemployable, and our
potential output capacity contracts. Raising rates now would be premature,
and while other policy regimes have had historically limited success, the
burden of proof falls on our recommendation. As such, any one of the
advantages to our policy discussed above could be used to persuade a
battle-tested and wary Federal Reserve.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Nominal GDP & Potential Nominal GDP

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Figure 2: Revisions to GDP

Source: VoxEU.org
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Figure 3: Civilian Unemployment Rate

Source: U.S. Department of Labor: bureau of Labor Statistics

Figure 4: Unemployment Rate and Labor Force Participation Rate
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Figure 5: Wage Growth Average Hourly Earnings

Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Figure 6: Oil Prices over the past two years

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
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Figure 7: Measure of Household “Debt Overhang”

Source: Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve, Bureau of
Economic Analysis

Figure 8: Personal Savings Rate

Source: US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis

83

Figure 9: Case-Shiller Home Price Index

Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC
Figure 10: Bank Lending Standards
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Figure 11: United States Nominal Exchange Rate

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Figure 12: Consumer Expenditure
Real Personal Consumption Expenditure
Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
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2014 Fed Challenge Script
by: Jieran Liu, Will Northrop, Matthew Nadler,
Owen Rothe, and Ryan Williams
Economics 267 & 367 Fall 2014
Current State of The Economy

Good afternoon everyone and thank you for having us here
today. Though the recession began in 2007 and officially ended in 2009,
recovery has been painfully slow. GDP growth has been insufficient to
close the output gap, there continues to be slack in the labor market and
inflation has stabilized below the Federal Reserve percent target. We are
not meeting our dual mandate of full employment and stable prices even 6
years after the end of the recession. Despite some signs of strengthening in
the economy during the past year, we do not believe that economy is on a
self-sustaining path of recovery. Furthermore, the monetary policy actions
taken by the Fed thus far to pull us out of the Great Recession have been
insufficient. We propose a substantial strengthening of the our forward
guidance; specifically, a commitment not to raise the federal funds rate
until nominal GDP has returned to a path that we consider consistent with
the dual mandate.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates the output gap to be
around 3.6% in 2014 and projects a return to full employment by 2017.
However, this forecast reflects the fact that the CBO has revised downward
its estimate of potential GDP every year for the last 7 years. The economy is
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approaching full employment not because of strong growth in actual GDP
but because of repeated downward revisions in potential GDP. [VoxEU
slide] Larry Summers estimates that half of the decline in potential output
is due to a drop in the capital stock due to lower investment since 2008, a
phenomenon that could be reversed with sufficient economic expansion.
The unemployment rate fell to 5.8 percent in October, at the top
end of our current range of estimates for the natural rate of 5.2 percent
to 5.8 percent. But, the low unemployment rate disguises a large amount
of slack in labor markets. For instance, the labor-force participation rate
has fallen from 65.9percent to 62.8 percent since the beginning of the
recession. While some is due to structural factors, research by Stephanie
Aaronson and her co-workers finds that 0.25 – 1.0 percent of the decline
is due to cyclical factors. The employment - population ratio is low, also
suggesting cyclical factors contributing to unemployment. Probably the
most convincing evidence of slack in the labor market is the failure of
wages to rise significantly: average nominal hourly earnings increased
only 2.2 percent in the year ending in October.
Inflation has been below the 2 percent target since 2012. According
to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the core PCE chain-type price index
increased at a rate of only 1.4 percent for the twelve months ending in
October. There are no signs of inflationary pressure in the economy. Oil
prices have fallen in recent months due to global economic weakness and
new energy supplies. The price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil has
fallen to $81 per barrel at the end of October from over $100 in June.
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In addition, the dollar has appreciated significantly against other major
currencies, putting downward pressure on prices of imported goods. And
again, wage growth has been subdued. The absence of inflationary pressure
is apparent from the decrease in the spread between the yields of 5-year
nominal Treasury Securities and 5-year TIPS bonds (or the ‘breakeven
inflation rate’) which has fallen from 2 percent in June to 1.6 percent in
November. This indicates that the market expectations are currently that
inflation will fall short of the target for the next five years.
The current sustained weakness in the economy is likely to persist
for a long time. The crash in the housing market weakened household
balance sheets. Research by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi has shown
convincingly that the debt overhang has contributed to weak consumption
growth. Richard Koo calls this a ‘balance sheet recession’ and notes that
recovery will be slow because of household deleveraging, which reduces
consumption spending. Koo and other economists such as Larry Summers
and Olivier Blanchard warn of the possibility of insufficient aggregate
demand for as long as the next 10-15 years.
A self-sustaining recovery cannot occur until households have
worked off the debt overhang. Data on household debt show that there is
a long way to go. Total credit market debt of households is 105 percent of
disposal income, still higher than any year before 2002. Consistent with
Koo’s theory, household savings remains high, especially relative to prerecession trends. The personal saving rate has been above 5 percent since
the recession, compared to 2-4 percent from 2005-07. Recovery in the
housing market is widely seen as essential for improvement in household
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finances. But after signs of strength in 2013 the housing market has cooled
off in 2014. Acording to Case-Shiller home price index, house prices fell
1.3 percent from April to August of this year. Real residential investment
has fallen by one percent in the year ending in the third quarter of 2014.
Recent positive developments have caused speculation that we
will start raising interest rates in mid-2015. This is premature. Though
GDP growth was estimated to be 3.5% in 2014 Q3, the widening of the
trade deficit for September suggests that this figure will likely be revised
downward.The results of the midterm elections suggest that fiscal policy
could become more of a drag on economic performance in the near
future due to increased pressure to cut spending. The low employment
growth domestically, coupled with slow projected growth for Europe and
certain emerging economies, suggest that making monetary policy less
accommodative would be premature and costly to a still-shaky American
economy.

Our Policy Recommendation: Clarify Forward Guidance

With the phasing out of large-scale asset purchases last month,
we are currently relying on forward guidance to reduce long-term interest
rates. But the type of forward guidance that we have employed since 2009
has been less effective than it could be. From August 2011 to October
2012 we specified that we would keep the federal funds rate near zero until
a particular date, a policy known as calendar-based forward guidance. In
December 2012 the we switched to a data-based forward guidance strategy
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by promising not to raise the federal funds rate until the unemployment rate
fell to 6.5%. But in March 2012, as the unemployment rate was dropping
more quickly than anticipated, we changed our criteria to a mix of labor
market conditions. Michael Woodford has argued that the our statements
to this point have not had the desired effect because the we have not been
clear enough about the criteria that we will use to judge whether to raise
the federal funds rate. As a result the we have not been as successful in
managing long-term interest rates as it could be.
We propose that the Federal Reserve clarify the criteria that will
trigger the beginning of interest rate increases. Under our proposal, which
is similar to recommendations made by Michael Woodford and others, the
FOMC will pledge to maintain the federal funds rate target at its current
range as long as nominal GDP remains below a deterministic path. This
path would represent the path it would have followed if monetary policy
had not been constrained policy by the zero lower bound since 2008.
Specifically, as indicated by our proposed statement, we project a trend of
4% annual growth in nominal GDP from the fourth quarter of 2007. We
commit to holding off on interest rate increases until we are close to the
target. When we are close to the target we will begin to increase interest
rates at a measured pace so that policy is normalized at the trend level of
GDP.
Our proposal improves on the current forward guidance strategy
in the following ways.
●

The nominal GDP criterion clarifies the ultimate goals of the
FOMC. It replaces the vague references in the current statement
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to “a wide range of information, including measures of labor
market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation
expectations, and readings on financial developments.” We
thereby send a clearer signal to the public about how much more
growth must occur before the we begin to raise interest rates.
●

We estimate that under this proposal we will not begin raising
interest rates for at least two years. This is a more expansionary
signal than the current policy, under which expectations are for
rate increases beginning next summer, which will lower longterm interest rates.

●

The nominal GDP criterion promises a combination of real
economic expansion and higher inflation. The prospect of
economic expansion will increase consumer and business
confidence and generate higher spending. The prospect of higher
inflation will generate more spending by lowering real interest
rates. Higher inflation also reduces the real value of household
debt, which will assist in recovery of balance sheets. This is an
improvement over the current policy, which risks signaling to the
public that the Fed views the current state of the real economy
and inflation under two percent as satisfactory outcomes.

We have prepared some forecasts of what our policy implies
for the economy. The scenarios shown on the graph assume that the real
output gap is currently 4 percent and the growth rate of potential GDP is
2 percent. Real GDP has grown at an annual rate of 2.3 percent in each of
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the last two years. At this pace, it will take over 13 years for the economy
to reach full employment.
●

Nominal GDP is currently 8.7% below the nominal GDP trend
line that we hope to achieve. We assume that trend nominal GDP
grows at 4% per year.

●

Scenario 1 assumes that the combination of lower long-term
interest rates and increased expectations of growth and inflation
causes nominal GDP to reach its target in two years. This requires
nominal GDP to grow at an average rate of 8.4% per year.
Inflation in excess of current levels is unlikely unless there is a
strong pickup in real GDP growth, so it is reasonable to assume
that nominal growth is roughly evenly divided between real
growth and inflation. This would imply 4.2% real growth and
4.2% inflation per year, which would eliminate the output gap in
the year that the nominal GDP target is achieved.

●

Scenario 2, which we believe is more likely, assumes that the
nominal GDP trend line is reached in three years. This requires
nominal GDP to grow at an average rate of 6.9 percent per year.
If growth is evenly divided between real growth and inflation, this
implies 3.5 percent real growth and 3.5% inflation per year, and
again the output gap is eliminated when the trend line is reached.

●

Scenario 3 assumes a four year path to recovery. This requires
nominal GDP to grow at an average pace of 6.2 percent per year.
Real GDP grows at 3.1 percent and inflation is 3.1 percent, and the
output gap is eliminated when the trend line is reached.
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Our policy risks higher inflation if the output gap turns out to be
smaller than we believe it is. For example, under Scenario 2, nominal GDP
grows at a rate of 6.9 percent per year. If the output gap is two percent rather
than four percent, we could conceivably see the output gap eliminated
in two years and real growth falling to two percent in year three, which
would imply a 4.9 percent rate of inflation in that year. Clearly inflation
at that level is not acceptable in the long run, but a temporary burst of
inflation is a small price to pay for full recovery from the recession. In
the final analysis, even in the high inflation scenario the average inflation
rate beginning in 2007 will be near the our target of 2 percent; the higher
period of inflation we promise for the most part merely compensates for
the below-target inflation of the last several years.
To conclude, we find that the economy is in worse shape than it
appears to be judging from the unemployment rate and the CBO’s estimate
of the output gap. The Federal Reserve has fallen short of its mandate of
full employment and price stability since the recession began in 2007. Our
proposal offers a chance to restore full employment and price stability. It
does so by clarifying the our forward guidance statement: specifically, by
committing us in terms that are as explicit as possible to a period of growth
and reflation. It is a bold step, but one that is absolutely necessary in light
of current economic conditions. Thank you for listening, and we welcome
your questions.
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Flooding in the Kashmir Valley: Macroeconomic Effects
of a Natural Disaster in India
by Danielle Cupp
Abstract
This paper presents India’s economic growth by comparing it to that of
the United States. In addition, this paper analyzes current events in India
under a macroeconomic lens as it provides the macroeconomic impacts
of said events. More specifically, this paper focuses on the ways in which
unexpected severe flooding have impacted Northern India in the short-,
medium-, and long-run. Analyses conclude with policy recommendations
based on the goals of India’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).
I. Executive Summary
After gaining independence in 1947, India has experienced accelerated
growth and is now considered one of the largest and fastest growing economies
in the world. After a fiscal crisis in the early 1900s, India’s economy adopted
open-market policies and opened to international trade, which is considered
one of the economy’s most substantial boosts. India, however, still faces a
number of challenges that impede on its development. India encounters, for
example, extreme poverty and unresolved territory disputes with Pakistan and
China. In addition, India is experiencing a period of anemic growth, in which
its growth rate has declined to 4.4% since 2012. The Indian rupee has been
depreciating, adding to these economic difficulties (Ranjan Mishra). India’s
central bank, the Reserve Bank of India, was conceived after independence in
1947 controls the monetary policy on the Indian rupee and its main objectives
consist of maintaining price stability and ensuring that there is an adequate
flow of credit to productive sectors in the economy (“About Us”).
96

II. Summary on Developments
Throughout this semester, I have analyzed the macroeconomic
consequences of unanticipated events in Indian history while analyzing
the nation’s growth. When comparing India’s GDP to that of the United
States, we see that they are converging, affirming the theory that countries
with a lower GDP experience higher rates of growth. In addition, we
also see that India’s output per capita growth rate, TFP contribution rate,
and per capita capital contribution are all higher than those of the United
States. All of these indicate that India’s economy is growing at a faster rate
than that of the United States.
In addition, I analyzed the macroeconomic effects of current,
unexpected events in India. I predicted, for example, the ways in which
output and unemployment would be affected by a devastating flood.
I estimated that the impacts would be in particularly severe given the
storm’s unprecedented harshness and the fact that the economy in that
region is heavily dependent on the agricultural sector. Next, I analyzed the
macroeconomic impact on the power industry, specifically coal companies
as they faced fines and incurred setbacks as the government revoked 214
coal leases. Lastly, I addressed the ways in which Prime Minister Narendra
Modi’s war on terror would affect the economy, specifically his crackdown
on off-shore accounts. I predicted that Indians would transfer more of
their money back into Indian accounts, increasing the money supply and
increase total output in the country.
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Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3
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III. Shock Under Analysis: Flooding in the Kashmir Valley
Flooding in the Kashmir Valley in September of 2014 hit record
highs in this area of northern India. While monsoons bring devastation
to this region every year, this disaster qualifies as a shock because it
was the worst flood the valley has experienced in 100 years, leaving
600,000 people stranded and numerous roads, schools, bridges, crops,
and hospitals destroyed. (“Kashmir Flood Disaster – How the Next One
Could Be Avoided”). The Kashmir Valley lies in the Indian state of Jammu
and Kashmir; the economy in this region is in particularly dependent on
agriculture and related activities (“CHAPTER III: Socio-Economic and
Administrative Development”). Since this flood occurred in September,
the region has experienced more flooding, hindering the government’s
ability to rebuild and return to the previous rate of productivity.

IV. Short-Run Analysis
To examine the short-run impact on the harshness of the weather
conditions, we will use the model provided below. The storm will decrease
productivity, employment, and consumption, which can be modeled
as a downward shift in the ZZ curve. When the ZZ curve shifts down,
output decreases (to YA) and the IS curve shifts leftward (to ISA). Due to
the decrease in output, the demand for liquidity decreases, modeled by a
leftward shift in the L(Y) curve (to L(YA)). Now, the liquidity and goods
markets clear at a lower interest rate and output level (iB and YB). When the
shock is incorporated into the AS-AD model, the AD curve shifts left. As
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a result, the price level decreases, which increases the real money supply.
Now, the goods and liquidity markets clear at an even lower interest rate,
but a relatively higher output level (i1 and Y1). Thus, the ZZ curve shifts up
(to ZZ1), which demonstrations how the AS-AD model and the liquidity
market reduce the multiplier effect. In addition, the exchange rate has
decreased as the rupee has depreciated under the UIP condition.
Figure 4
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V. Medium-Run Analysis
The same model can be used to display the medium-run implications
of the shock. For simplicity, the graphs below only show the short-run
equilibrium (1) with the output, interest rate, exchange rate, and price level
from the initial equilibrium shown on the axes as a reference. In addition,
India’s natural rate of output has been added as the economy returns to
the natural rate of output in the medium-run. India is characterized by a
large output gap and chronic unemployment. The Reserve Bank of India
has estimated that the Indian economy has a potential growth rate in the
range of 8.2 to 10.2 percent, but in recent years the growth rate in India has
fallen short of the lower limit (“Estimation of Potential Output in India”).
In 2013, for example, India’s economy only grew by 5% (“GDP Growth
(annual %)”). As a result of the output gap and chronic unemployment,
the natural rate of output will be higher than the initial level of output. In
the medium run, output eventually returns to the natural level of output.
This adjustment occurs through successive changes in the price level and
is modeled by shifts in the AS curve. Since the natural level of output is
higher than the actual rate of unemployment, the AS curve will shift down.
This lowers the price level (to P2), which increases the real money stock.
The rightward shift in the real money results in a decrease in the interest
rate and a downward shift in the LM curve. Consequently, the decrease in
the interest rate increases investment (from i1 to i2), which shifts the ZZ
curve upward (to ZZ2). The exchange rate has decreased again and the
rupee has continued to depreciate under the UIP condition.
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Figure 5
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VI. Long-Run Analysis
The long-run effect of this mass flooding in Kashmir can be
modeled in the Solow Growth Diagram. The increase in the severity of
this natural disaster (in addition to other flooding that the region already
experiences) has caused the physical capital to depreciate more rapidly. This
is modeled by a leftward swing in the break-even line. In addition, since the
flooding was so severe that it destroyed crops, output decreased. This can be
represented as a decrease in productivity (A). This would increase the capital
per effective units of labor, a rightward jump in ka. Initially, the capital per
effective units of labor jumps right (to k*a, 1) such that it is above the steadystate value (k*a, 0). Therefore, the amount of capital per effective units of
labor that the economy is accumulating is less that the amount of capital
per effective units of labor that the economy is losing due to depreciation,
technological progress, and population growth. Capital per effective units of
labor decreases (at a decreasing rate due to decreasing returns to scale) until
it reaches the new steady state (k*a, 2). Now the steady state value is lower
than it was initially due to the increase in the depreciation rate. The impulse
response functions show the new balanced growth paths. The decrease in
productivity means that output per effective units of labor and capital per
effective units of labor jump up and then decrease at a decreasing rate until
they reach the new, lowered balanced growth path. Output per capita and
output both decrease at a decreasing rate until they reach their new, lowered
balanced growth paths. These new balanced growth paths are lowered
because productivity is permanently lowered by this shock.
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Figure 6
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VII. Fiscal and Monetary Policy Recommendations
One of the objectives of the Reserve Bank of India is to achieve
price stability, but one of the long-run consequences of this shock is a
decrease in the price level. I suggest both a contractionary monetary policy
and an expansionary fiscal policy. Under both, the price level will increase,
output will remain at the natural level out output, and there will be an
appreciation in Indian currency. As a result of the fiscal expansion and the
contractionary monetary policy, the ZZ curve shifts up (to ZZA), the real
money demand decreases (to MC /P) and liquidity demand increases (to
L(YA)). Consequently, the IS curve shifts right and the LM curve shifts up,
such that iC and YC clear both the goods and liquidity markets (at point c).
The AD curve will shift right, but then the AS curve will also shift such
that the economy returns to the natural rate of output. It is important to
note that the net effect is an increase in the price level. As a result, the
real money supply shifts left again, increasing the interest rate, which also
shifts the LM curve upwards (to LM3). The liquidity and goods markets
now clear at i3 and Yn. The ZZ curve shifts down such that the output level
is also at Yn. While there was a fiscal expansion, the increase in the ZZ
line was offset by the decrease in investment as the interest rate increased
from i2 to i3.
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Figure 7
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